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Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is designed to guarantee the authenticity and
integrity of digital assets such as messages, executable binaries, etc. In PKIs, there
are two representative applications: 1) the Web PKI and 2) the Code-Signing PKI.
1) The Web PKI enables entities (e.g., clients and web service providers) to securely
communicate over untrusted networks such as the Internet, and 2) the Code-Signing
PKI helps protect clients from executing files of unknown origin. However, anec-
dotal evidence has indicated that adversaries compromised and abused the PKIs,
which poses security threats to entities. For example, CAs have mis-issued digital
certificates to adversaries due to their failed vetting processes. Moreover, private
keys that are supposed to be securely kept were stolen by adversaries. Such mis-
issued certificates or stolen private keys were used to launch impersonation attacks.
In this regard, we need to have a sound understanding of such security threats and
adversaries’ behaviors in the PKIs to mitigate them and further to enhance the
security of the PKIs.
In this dissertation, we conduct a large-scale measurement study in the two
representative applications—the Web PKI and the Code-Signing PKI—to better
understand adversaries’ behaviors and the potential security threats. First, in 1)
the Web PKI, we mainly focus on phishing websites served with TLS certificates.
From the measurement study, we observe that certificate authorities (CAs) often fail
in their vetting process and mis-issue TLS certificates to adversaries (i.e., phishing
attackers). Also, CAs rarely revoke their issued TLS certificates that have been com-
promised. Second, in 2) the Code-Signing PKI, we characterize the weaknesses of
the three actors (i.e., CAs, software publishers, and clients) that adversaries can ex-
ploit to compromise the Code-Signing PKI. Moreover, we measure the effectiveness
of the primary defense, revocation, against the Code-Signing PKI abuses. We find
that erroneous revocations (e.g., wrong effective revocation date setting) can pose
additional security threats to clients who execute binaries because the revocations
become ineffective. Such security threats stem from an inherent challenge of setting
an effective revocation date in the Code-Signing PKI and CAs’ misunderstanding
of the PKI. These findings help Anti-Virus companies and a CA fix their flaws.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Securely communicating with other entities and exchanging digital assets over
untrusted networks such as the Internet is significantly challenging. Adversaries
can impersonate other people, eavesdrop digital communications, and alter digital
assets for their malicious purpose. For example, an adversary is able to conduct a
man-in-the-middle attack (MITM) against an online banking service. In this attack,
an adversary is placed in the middle of two entities (i.e., client and online bank)
and she/he can eavesdrop and steal the client’s ID and password for her/his online
banking service.
To this end, Public Key Cryptography was designed and introduced. In the
cryptographic technique, to guarantee the authenticity and integrity of digital assets,
a pair of two keys, a public key and a private key are required. A private key must
be securely kept by an owner and the key is used to sign digital assets such as
digital messages and executable binaries, called a digital signature. In turn, another
key, a public key is publicly available to other people including even adversaries.
The key is used by anyone to verify a digital signature. A successful verification
with the public key indicates that the digital assets are never altered after signed
(i.e., integrity) and they are originated from the owner of the private key (i.e.,
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authenticity). Furthermore, even though a public key is associated with a private key
is publicly available, it is computationally infeasible for anyone including adversaries
to derive the private key from the public key because they are mathematically related
and guaranteed not to readily break.
Another challenge inherent to Public Key Cryptography is the difficulty of
establishing trust in the ownership of public keys. In other words, we are unable
to know whether public keys are legitimately originated from its real owner of the
associated private keys. Some adversaries can impersonate someone else and send
their malicious public keys to victims. In turn, victims are unable to derive the
owner’s information from the public key because the public key has no informa-
tion regarding the owner of the associated private key. To this end, a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) is designed. In a PKI, there are trusted third-parties, called
Certificate Authorities (CAs) who are supposed to verify the owner of a public key
and bind the public key to the owner’s information. The binding information—
including the owner’s information and the owner’s public key—are specified in an
X.509 v3 certificate [5], called a digital certificate. Entities who want to securely
communicate use this digital certificate to verify the public key and the ownership
of the public key.
In PKIs, the two representative applications are 1) the Web PKI and 2) the
Code-signing PKI. 1) The Web PKI is designed and deployed for secure commu-
nication on the Internet. In the PKI, it helps entities (i.e., clients) authenticate web
servers and guarantee the integrity of messages between clients and web servers. As
of April 2020, more than 90% Internet traffic is securely encrypted, which means
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that most websites are served in the Web PKI [6]. Another PKI, 2) the Code-Signing
PKI is used for executable binaries. In the PKI, entities (i.e., clients) are able to
establish trust in signed binaries. In other words, they can know who has published
signed binaries and whether or not signed binaries are altered.
However, PKIs have been compromised by adversaries for their malicious pur-
poses such as economic or political gains [7–14]. For example, in the Web PKI,
adversaries exploited the DigiNotar ’s (a CA) issuance systems and fraudulently is-
sued a wildcard certificate for Google. Using the misissued Google certificate, the
adversaries conducted a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack against Google services
in Iran [7]. Furthermore, in the Code-Signing PKI, other adversaries stole private
keys from reputable two Taiwanese companies and signed their malware, Stuxnet
with the stolen private keys [14]. In this regard, we need to have a deep understand-
ing of potential security threats and adversaries behaviors in the PKIs to mitigate
them and further to enhance the security of the PKIs.
In this dissertation, we conduct a large-scale measurement study in the two
representative PKIs—1) the Web PKI and 2) the Code-Signing PKI—to better
understand security threats and adversary behaviors. This dissertation consists of
a series of measurement studies in the Web PKI (Chapter 4) and the Code-Signing
PKI (Chapter 5). In these measurement studies, we aim to understand adversary
behaviors—such as how they compromise the two PKIs for their malicious goals—
and identify new potential security threats.
The Web PKI. This dissertation begins with understanding the current landscape
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of the security threats in the Web PKI (Chapter 4). We mainly focus on phishing at-
tacks in the Web PKI. Specifically, we attempt to better understand how adversaries
abuse the Web PKI for their phishing attacks.
Modern web browsers such as Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, etc. display a
green or gray padlock icon in its URL bar when clients access web services served
in the Web PKI (i.e., TLS). Technically, the green padlock icon indicates that the
authenticity and integrity of a website that a client communicates are guaranteed.
However, unfortunately, many clients (potential victims) incorrectly believe that
the green padlock icon in the modern browsers means that phishing attacks can be
prevented (Section 4.1) [15–18].
Adversaries can take advantage of this misunderstanding of the green padlock
icon by serving their phishing websites with valid TLS certificates. Typical users may
be tricked by phishing websites deployed with valid TLS certificates because valid
TLS certificates can be presented as a green padlock icon in the users’ web browsers.
Moreover, according to the report of Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), ap-
proximately more than 60% of phishing websites are launched with TLS certificates
in the first quarter of 2019 [19]. This indicates that more TLS phishing attacks
occur than plain HTTP phishing attacks do. In this regard, we need to understand
how adversaries abuse the Web PKI (i.e., TLS) for their phishing attacks.
We first attempt to understand the current landscape of the phishing attacks
with TLS certificates (the Web PKI). We analyze 5.05M phishing URLs collect
from eCrimeX, and find that 1) CAs rarely revoke abusive certificates and 2) a
CA’s vetting process often fails (as described in Section 4.2).
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The Code-Signing PKI. In the second part of the dissertation, we mainly focus
the Code-Signing PKI; specifically, 1) we fully characterize the weaknesses of the
three actors (certificate authorities, software publishers, and end-users) in the PKI
that adversaries can exploit (Section 5.3), 2) we systemically measure the security
threats of the Code-Signing PKI in the wild, 3) we also aim to understand the
underground economy of code-signing certificate (Section 5.4), and 4) we measured
the effectiveness of the primary defense, revocation, against the abuse (Section 5.5).
Adversaries always aim to generate sophisticated malware for economic or po-
litical gain. More importantly, they also seek to effectively distribute their malware
to end-users (victims) and to lure the end-users to install the malware while con-
cealing its identity. The sophisticated malware, Stuxnet can be a representative
example. The malware was signed with the stolen private keys of two code-signing
certificates from reputable Taiwanese companies, which helped malware authors hide
their identities and lured end-users to readily establish trust in the signed malware.
Even worse, the signed malware remained undetected for a longer period because
Anti-virus companies neglected to perform further inspection as they were properly
signed with code-signing certificates of the well-known companies [14].
As observed, adversaries have abused the Code-Signing Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI) for their malicious goals, and their exploits were significantly effective.
However, little attention has been paid on such abuses in the Code-Signing PKI be-
cause security researchers presumably believed that the abuse was uncommon in the
wild and the security threats were the same as in the Web PKI (e.g., TLS). More-
over, the Code-Signing PKI inherently has a challenge of Code-Signing certificate
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collection in the wild due to the nature of software distribution while in the Web
PKI, TLS certificates can be readily collected via network scanners (e.g., ZMap).
We identify the root causes of the abuses in the Code-Signing PKI. We began
by fully characterizing the weaknesses of the three actors (certificate authorities,
software publishers, and end-users) in the PKI that adversaries can exploit (Sec-
tion 5.3). We then systemically measured the security threats of the Code-Signing
PKI in the wild to understand the prevalence of malware signed with abusive cer-
tificates after overcoming the challenge of certificate collection (Section 5.3 and
Section 5.4). We also aim to understand the underground economy of code-signing
certificates (Section 5.4). Last, we measure the effectiveness of the primary defense,
revocation, against the abuses (Section 5.5). We highlight the ineffective revocation
can lead end-users to remain exposed to the security threats although such abu-
sive certificates have been already revoked by the issuing CAs. Our findings helped
Anti-Virus companies and a certificate authority (CA) fix their flaws stemmed from
a misunderstanding of the Code-Signing PKI. Our results and datasets are available
at http://signedmalware.org .
1.1 Published Works and Copyrights
This dissertation extends the materials from four papers by the author Doowon
Kim [1–4]; three of them have been already published at ACM CCS 2017, WEIS
2018, and USENIX Security 2018 and another paper is in submission.
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Chapter 2: Background Principles
In this chapter, I overview Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs): particularly,
two representative PKIs, 1) the Web PKI (i.e., TLS) and 2) the Code-Signing PKI
(i.e., Windows Authenticode).
2.1 Overview of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) relies on the digital signature mechanism
to enable entities (e.g., clients and service providers) to securely exchange the digital
assets (e.g., messages, email, software, etc.) over untrusted networks such as the
Internet. The digital signature mechanism guarantees the authenticity and integrity
of digital assets, and requires a signer (i.e., a service provider) to generate a pair of
public and private keys using a mathematical algorithm such as RSA. A private key
is always securely kept by the signer and is used to sign a digital asset; another pair
key, public key, associated with the private key is publicly available and is used to
verify the digital signature. If the digital asset is altered after signed, the signature
is no longer verified and trusted.
However, the main problem of the digital signature mechanism is that in the
untrusted networks, how we can establish trust in public keys legitimately origi-
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nated from the owner of the private keys. In other words, adversaries can imper-
sonate someone else and send their malicious public keys to victims. In PKIs, there
are trusted entities, called Certificate Authorities (CAs) in whom all entities (e.g.,
service providers and clients) can establish trust. When service providers (e.g., web-
sites or software publishers) want to provide clients with signed digital assets and
the associated public keys, they need to apply for digital certificates issued from Cer-
tificate Authorities (CAs). After carefully verifying the applicants’ identities, the
CAs issue digital certificates that bind the applicants’ public keys to their identities.
In order to prevent the digital certificates from being forged, the leaf certificates are
also signed with the issuing CA’s private key of the intermediate certificate and
then signed with the private key of the root certificate. When a client verifies a
digital signature created for a digital asset, the client has to validate each digital
signature using a chain of trust ; the trust anchor is the root certificate pre-installed
on client’s machine such as operating systems, web browsers, etc. Moreover, they
are also responsible to revoke compromised digital certificates that they have issued
after they discover that their issued certificates are misused for malicious purposes.
2.2 The Web PKI (TLS)
In PKIs, one of the most representative examples is the Web PKI (e.g., Trans-
port Layer Security). Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security
(TLS) aim to provide privacy and data integrity between two entities, servers and
clients. In other words, the protocols have been designed to prevent eavesdropping
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and tampering such as a Man-in-the-middle attack. Therefore, TLS/SSL becomes
the de facto standard for the secure communications over the untrusted networks
such as the Internet. More than 90% of the Internet traffic was encrypted and se-
curely communicated over TLS/SSL in 2020 [20]. The TLS/SSL protocols rely on
a PKI, called the Web PKI. In the ecosystem, Certificates Authorities (CAs) are
a publicly trusted third-party entity. They are able to issue digital certificate (i.e.,
TLS certificates) after vetting processes. Moreover, another responsibility is revoca-
tion. In this process, they revoke their issued TLS certificates when they discovered
that the certificates are mis-issued or misused for malicious purposes.
2.2.1 Type of CAs
Initially, there had been only a few commercial CAs (e.g., Comodo, DigiCert,
GoDaddy, etc.). Website owners or administrators had to pay for TLS certificates to
obtain certificates and deploy their websites with the issued certificates. However,
recently, a new method, called Automated Certificates Management Environment
(ACME) protocol has been designed and deployed [21], which leads to the wide
adoption of TLS. In this protocol, human-involvements such as applicants’ verifica-
tion process are reduced as much as possible. Therefore, the ACME CAs do not
charge any price to applicants (i.e., website administrators) when issuing TLS cer-
tificates. Due to this price reason, in April 2020, more than 90% of the Internet
traffic have been securely communicated over TLS [20].
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2.2.2 Required Practices for CAs
There are standard guidelines where basic requirements of CAs are manifested:
1) CA/Browser Baseline Requirements [22] and 2) Certificate Practice Statement
(CPS). CA/Browser Baseline Requirements manifests a standard guideline that CAs
should follow. In addition, each CA publishes its own practice statements, called
Certificate Practice Statement (CPS). Each CPS is specified at its x.509 v3 certifi-
cate [23].
2.2.2.1 CA/Browser Baseline Requirements
The voluntary business association of CAs, web browsers, and other PKI-
related groups, called Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum),
has publicized the guidelines of the issuance and management of X.509 digital certifi-
cates (e.g., revocation and how to securely manage private keys). Baseline Require-
ments [22] is the current standard guideline, and was published in 2011 and became
effective from June 2012.1 The standard guideline covers all type of TLS certificates
such as DV (Domain Validation), OV (Organization Validation), and EV (Extended
Validation). Furthermore, all CAs should comply with Baseline Requirements.
2.2.2.2 Certificate Practice Statement (CPS)
In addition to CA/B BRs (Baseline Requirement), each CA specifies its own
rules of practices for management procedures; it is called Certificate Practice State-
1The current version (1.6.5) was published on April 16, 2019.
10
ment (CPS). Particularly, such the document specifies how to verify applicants, how
to issue TLS certificates, and how/when they revoke certificates if compromised or
misused. CPS must be specified in the Certificate Policies extension of an X.509 v3
certificate [23].
2.2.3 Type of TLS Certificates
Typically, there are three types of TLS certificates depending on CAs’ valida-
tion procedures. First, Domain Validated (DV) certificates are the most commonly
used in the wild because the ACME protocol was designed and deployed, and the
protocol supports such certificates at free charge. The DV certificates require the
most minimal validation process where CAs only check whether applicants own do-
mains. In other words, they see only the ownership of domains to which certificates
will be issued. The ACME CAs provide free TLS certificates for applicants (i.e.,
webserver administrators), which leads to the wide adoption of TLS certificates in
the wild.
Second, Organization Validated (OV) certificates are issued only after the
issuing CAs check if domains are owned by the applicants and the applicants’ in-
formation is legitimate. web browsers tend to display the applicants’ information
(i.e., website companies). The price of OV certificates is higher than DV certifi-
cates because CAs should be involved in the issuance procedure when they check
the applicants’ identity such as government-issued ID or business information.
Last, Extended Validation (EV) certificates are the highest-ranking and most
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expensive TLS certificates. Applicants who want EV certificates need to go through
the extended identity verification process to assert that they are authorized and
exclusively own the rights to use the domains. In turn, web browsers are likely to
display information of the domain owner such as company name, which helps clients
ensure that they access legitimate websites.
2.2.4 Revocation in the Web PKI
CAs have another important responsibility besides the issuance of TLS certifi-
cates, which is revocation. Revocation means that the issuing CAs make their issued
certificates no longer valid when they become compromised and misused. CAs can
revoke TLS certificates for a variety of reasons; (1) certificates are fraudulently is-
sued to adversaries (e.g, DigiNotar) [7,24,25], (2) the associated private keys became
compromised (e.g., Heartbleed) [26], and (3) the issued certificates have been mis-
used (e.g., phishing attacks). Moreover, when the CAs are made aware that their
issued TLS certificates no longer comply with the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Re-
quirements [22] such as a cryptographically weak key used for TLS certificates [27],
they also should revoke the certificates.
After they revoke TLS certificates, they need to disseminate the revocation
information to clients. Currently, two dissemination methods are being widely used:
(1) Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and (2) Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) [5, 28].
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2.2.4.1 Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
A CA publishes CRL files that include revoked certificates information such
as serial numbers, revocation dates, and revocation reasons [5]. CAs have to update
and reissue their CRL files every a certain period; particularly, according to the
Baseline Requirements, they should do at least once every seven days. The locations
(URLs) of the CRLs files are specified at the CRL Distribution Point (CDP) of X.509
v3 certificates. In turn, clients should periodically access/download the CRL files
and then check if a TLS certificate is listed in the CRLs. The main problem of
this dissemination method is that clients have to download all unnecessary revoked
certificate information in which clients are not interested. The size of a single CRL
file has increased to even 76MB [29], which is significantly cumbersome for clients.
2.2.4.2 Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
This protocol was introduced to overcome the challenge of the network over-
heads in the CRLs. In this protocol, clients are able to simply query an OCSP server
for a TLS certificate that they want to check the revocation status [28]. This helps
reduce the network overheads on the client- and server-side as well. The OCSP
point is specified at Authority Information Access (AIA) of X.509 v3 certificates.
2.2.4.3 OCSP Stapling
Even though OCSP reduces the huge network overheads of CRLs, OCSP still
has a network latency because clients are supposed to query an OCSP server before
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establishing the trust in a TLS certificate of a certain website that the clients access.
In other words, the clients wait and cannot access the websites until OCSP responses
are sent to the clients. To reduce this latency, OCSP Stapling was introduced [30].
In this protocol, a website pre-fetches the revocation status of its TLS certificate and
sends clients the revocation status embedded in its TLS handshake when the clients
attempt to connect the website. This reduces the latency of the original OCSP.
2.2.5 Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs
A reseller of the CA, Comodo, was compromised in 2011 and mis-issued a
wildcard certificate for Google. Adversaries in Iran to conduct man-in-the-middle
attacks against Google using the mis-issued TLS certificate [8,9]. To mitigate these
misissuance problems, a new system is designed and deployed in 2020, called Cer-
tificate Transparency (CT) [31].
CT depends on publicly-available, verifiable certificate transparency logs. The
logs can be only appended using Markle hash tree so that no one is able to modify
the logs. In other words, when TLS certificates are issued, immediately the issued
certificates are logged in CT logs, but the already-logged TLS certificates are unable
to be modified or removed. Third-parties are able to audit and monitor issued
TLS certificates using CT. They are readily able to detect any misissuance of TLS
certificates from CT logs. Additionally, CT becomes a de-facto data source for TLS
certificate research because it logs almost-all TLS certificates in the wild.
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2.3 The Code-Signing PKI
Another application in Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) is the Code-Signing
PKI [32]. The PKI also utilizes the digital signature mechanism to guarantee the
authenticity and integrity of executable binaries. In other words, if an executable
binary is properly signed by a software publisher, clients are able to identify the
software publisher (i.e., authenticity), and check whether or not the signed software
program is altered after the software program is signed (i.e., integrity).
The CAs whom clients and software publishers can establish trust can issue
Code-Signing certificates to software publishers. Software publishers can use their
private keys associated with the issued Code-Signing certificates to sign their soft-
ware programs. In turn, since clients trust the issuing CAs, they can use the public
keys embedded in the certificates issued by the CAs to verify the digital signatures
bundled with the signed software programs.
Code-Signing certificates issued from CAs can be used to sign as numerous
software programs as the owners of the certificates want; however, in TLS, a TLS
certificate is typically bound to a certain domain since the domain name is specified
in the common name field and clients validate the common name and the domain
name when they try to access.
Various application platforms and major operating systems including Mi-
crosoft Windows, Apple macOS, iOS, Android, Linux, etc., support the code signing.
It is widely used for Windows and macOS executables and drivers, Firefox XPIs,
Android/iOS apps, Java Jars, Visual Basic for Applications, Adobe Air apps, etc.
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Another feature of the Code-Signing PKI in Windows is the trust updates that are
automatically assured and applied if the updates are signed with the same certificate
used by its original program code.
The Windows platforms are dominant in terms of the computer market share,
and prevalent malware in the wild is PE32 executables. Therefore, in this disserta-
tion, I will mainly focus on PE32 executables and Windows Authenticode [32].
2.3.1 Windows Authenticode Code-Signing PKI
Windows Authenticode [32] is a code signing standard in the Windows plat-
forms. It is used to sign Windows files such as Portable Executable (.exe), catalogs
(.cat) files, ActiveX controls (.ctl, and .ocx), dynamically loaded libraries (.dll),
cabinet files (.cab), etc. Authenticode also relies on Public Key Cryptography Stan-
dard (PKCS) #7 [33], and a PKCS #7-formatted content, called signed data that
includes a chain of X.509 v3 [5] code signing certificates, a chain of x.509 v3 Time
Stamping Authority (TSA) certificates, a digital signature, a signing date (trusted
timestamp), etc. Authenticode supports MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-256 hashes; but
currently MD5 and SHA-1 are no longer supported in Windows 10.
2.3.1.1 Protections that Rely on Code Signing
Microsoft SmartScreen and User Account Control (UAC). To combat mal-
ware, Microsoft Defender SmartScreen [34] have been designed to work with the
Code-Signing PKI and (usually internal) databases of applications and publishers’
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Figure 2.1: Example of UAC Warning Dialog.
reputation to assess if an application is safe to launch. UAC verifies a code signing
signature and displays the publisher’s name of the signature to clients when the
program of the signature requests an elevated privilege. For example, when an ex-
ecutable is downloaded on a Windows 10 machine, SmartScreen attempts to assess
its reputation before it allows the client to launch it, and when clients execute the
downloaded binary sample that requests an elevated privilege, UAC verifies the em-
bedded signature and shows the software publisher name to the clients as shown in
Figure 2.1.
There are two types of code signing certificates; 1) standard code signing
certificate and 2) Extended Validation (EV) code signing certificate. A standard
code signing certificate requires reputation before distributed and executed. In
particular, the reputation of binary samples signed with standard certificates can
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improve over time when the signed samples garner a track record of installations
on multiple hosts without raising suspicions. Without building up a reputation,
Windows UAC presents a warning dialog to clients with “Unknown Publisher.”
This represents a challenge for malware developers who aim to avoid suspicion and
to remain stealthy. Even if they manage to produce a valid signature for their
malware, they must also ensure that their Authenticode certificate has accumulated
a sufficient reputation in SmartScreen to prevent the user warning.
Meanwhile, an Extended Validation (EV) certificate can be issued with a
stricter vetting processing specified in the Guidelines for Extended Validation pro-
duced by the CA/Browser Forum2. Binary samples signed with EV certificates can
receive instant reputation in SmartScreen; in other words, EV certificates receive a
good reputation initially. From Windows 10 (version 1607), a stricter requirement
is set: EV certificates are necessary for any new kernel-mode drivers [35].
Safe Browsing. Google Safe Browsing is another protection system similar to the
SmartScreen. The white paper mentions that “Chrome trusts potentially dangerous
file types that match URLs in the white list, and it also trusts files signed by a
trusted authority [36].”
Anti-Virus. Anti-Virus engines also utilize code signing information. To reduce
false positives, some AV engines use whitelisting based on code signing certificates.
For example, Symantec mention in their whitelisting page: “To prevent false positive
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Figure 2.2: Windows PE and Authenticode Signature Format. The yellow
background sections are excluded in the calculation of a code-signing signature.
3 digital certificate3.”
2.3.1.2 Portable Executable (PE) Section
Authenticode is used to sign Portable Executable (PE) files. When a PE file
is signed, the Authenticode signature (authentihash) is embedded in the PE file:
specifically, in Attribute Certificate Table specified in the Certificate Table entry in
Optional Header Data Directories. An authentihash excludes certain PE sections in
3https://submit.symantec.com/whitelist/
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the yellow background in Figure 2.2.
2.3.2 Code Signing Process
Similar to the Web PKI (e.g., TLS), a publisher (i.e., a software author) first
applies for a code signing certificate from a CA with a pair of public and private
keys, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. After verifying the publisher’s identity, the CA
issues a code signing certificate based on the X.509 v3 certificate standard [5]. Unlike
TLS where a TLS certificate has a domain name as a common name, but a code
signing certificate has a software publisher’s name in a common name. In an X.509
v3 certificate, the applicant’s (publisher’s) information (such as locality address,
company name) is bound to the publisher’s public key. The publisher uses his/her
private key associated with the certificate to sign his/her software. Specifically,
in the signing process, the hash value of the software is first computed, and then,
the hash value is digitally signed with their private key. In the end, the digital
signature and the chain of the certificates are bundled with the original software.
On the client-side, clients verify the signature with the public key embedded in the
certificate when encountering the signed software. Clients are able to detect any
modifications to the program.
2.3.3 Trusted Timestamping
One of the distinct differences from other PKIs (such as TLS) is trusted times-

















Figure 2.3: Code signing process. 1) A publisher apply for a code signing certifi-
cate from a CA with his/her identifications, 2) After vetting, the CA issues a code
signing certificate to the publisher, 3) Using the SignTool (a signing tool provided
by Microsoft), the publisher signs a binary sample with the certificate, 4) when a
TSA is specified, the signing tool sends the hash value of the binary sample to the
TSA server, 5) The TSA server issues the timestamp and signs the timestamp, and
send them back to the signing tool, 6) The signing tool finally embeds the code
signing and TSA certificate chain, digital signature, and timestamp into the binary
sample, and 7) Finally, the publisher distributes the signed binary sample in the
wild.
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longer valid. Accordingly, the domain and web service bound to the certificate also
become invalid. However, in the Code-Signing PKI, due to the trusted timestamp-
ing. a signed binary sample can be valid even after its code signing certificate expires
if the binary sample file has been properly signed within the validity period of the
code signing certificate. This is because other trusted parties (i.e., Time Stamping
Authorities, TSAs) guarantee the authenticity and integrity of the timestamp by
signing the timestamp with their TSA certificate when the binary sample file is
signed. In turn, software clients are able to establish trust in the signed timestamp
by the TSA using the same chain of trust similar to other PKIs.
2.3.3.1 Process
More specifically, a publisher is required to send a hash value of a binary
sample file to a TSA; then the TSA signs the current timestamp and the hash value
with TSA’s certificate, and sends the current timestamp as well as the signature
back to the publisher as shown in Figure 2.3. The publisher bundles the binary
sample file with the timestamp signature and TSA’s certificates. Clients verify the
signature with the TSA’s public key in the TSA’s certificate.
2.3.4 Revocation in the Code-Signing PKI
Private keys can be compromised due to several reasons: for example, private
keys are stolen. The primary defense against compromised certificates is revocation.
Not only issuing code signing certificates, but also revoking compromised certifi-
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cates are the CAs’ main roles. Unlike the Web PKI where the compromised TLS
certificates immediately become invalid when CAs revoke the compromised TLS
certificates, in the Code-Signing PKI, CAs must investigate when code signing cer-
tificates become compromised, and set a revocation date, called effective revocation
date.
An effective revocation date determines the validity of signed binary files. In
other words, even though a code signing certificate is revoked, binary sample files
signed with the code signing certificate can be valid depending on the effective
revocation date set by an issuing CA. As shown in Figure 2.4, suppose that a code
signing certificate (issue date: ti and expiration date: te) is used to sign five binary
sample files at tb1..2 and tm1...3 (two of them are benign binary samples and the
others are malware). At a certain point, the certificate is found to be compromised.
The issuing CA revokes the compromised certificate and set effective revocation date
at tr between tm1 and tm2. The binary samples signed at tm2, tm3, and tb2 are no
longer valid since the these signing dates are after the effective revocation date, tr.
However, the binary samples signed at tb1 and tm1 (including malware) can be still
valid even though the certificate is already revoked since tb1 and tm1 are earlier than
tr.
There are two types of revocation dates: 1) effective revocation date (tr) and
2) revocation publication date (tp). Effective revocation date determines the validity
of signed program files. Revocation publication date is when CAs disseminate the
revocation information clients (i.e., adding revoked serial numbers into CRLs).
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Figure 2.4: 1) Example of an effective revocation date (tr). It determines
the validity of signed malware. 2) Revocation delay (tp - td). (ti: issue date, te:
expiration date, tr: effective revocation date, tb: signing date of a benign program,
tm: signing date of malware, td: detection date, and tp: revocation publication
date). When an effective revocation date is set to tr, the malware signed at tm1 can
be valid even though its code signing certificate has been already revoked because
it was signed before tr. [4]
2.3.4.1 Two Policies of Setting Effective Revocation Dates
There are two types of the revocation policies in the Code-Signing PKI; 1) hard
revocation and 2) soft revocation. When the effective revocation is set to the issue
date of a certificate, it is called hard revocation, and the effective revocation date is
set between ti and te, which is soft revocation. In hard revocation, all signed binary
samples (including malware and benign binary samples) become invalid so that there
exist no longer security threats. However, the software publishers have to re-sign
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their benign software and re-distribute the signed software. In soft revocation, if CAs
know when certificates become compromised, they need to set effective revocation
dates between between ti and te. In this case, they do not need to re-sign their all
software.
2.3.4.2 Dissemination of Revocation Information
After revoking compromised certificates, CAs must disseminate the revoked
certificate information to clients. The two predominant ways to disseminate certifi-
cate revocation information are (1) Certificate Revocation List (CRL) [5] and (2)
Online Certificate Status Protocol [28].
CRLs contain the revocation information (certificate serial numbers, (effec-
tive) revocation date, revocation reason) of certificates that have been revoked. Each
CRL is updated based on their CA’s issuance policy; for example, they can be issued
when a newly revoked certificate is inserted, or a specific time of day or a day of a
month. The location of the CRL for a specific certificate is contained in the signed
binary at CRL Distribution Point (CDP) of the X.509 certificate. The location
of the CRL is specified at CRL Distribution Point (CDP) of the X.509 certificate.
Clients have to periodically download the entire CRL (not just recent changes) to
check the latest revocations. HTTP is predominately used for downloading CRLs.
OCSP was introduced to resolve the network overhead problems of CRL.
Clients can simply query an OCSP server for a certain certificate, which helps mit-
igate the network overhead at the server as well as clients. Authority Information
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Access (AIA), an extension field in an X.509 certificate specifies OCSP point for
each certificate.
The TLS CAs are typically not responsible for providing the revocation status
of expired certificates. The code signing CAs, however, must maintain and provide
the revocation information of all certificates that they have issued including expired
certificates due to the trusted timestamp [38, 39]. Since the trusted timestamp
extends the life of a signed binary, CAs must maintain the CRLs and OCSP in
perpetuity to make revocation information always-available for clients.
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Chapter 3: Related Work
In this chapter, I discuss related work in two key areas: measuring the ecosys-
tem of the Web PKI (TLS) certificates; measuring Windows (Authenticode) code
signing abuse.
3.1 Measurements of the TLS Certificate Ecosystem
3.1.1 Data Collection of TLS Certificates
One of the most representative examples in PKIs is the Web PKI (i.e., TLS).
The ecosystem of the Web PKI has been well studied and the security threats in-
herent in the ecosystem have been identified, which has helped the improvements
of the ecosystem. This is because many network scanners such as Rapid7 [40] and
ZMap [41] had been introduced and used to collect TLS certificates. In particular,
ZMap is able to scan the entire IPv4 address around less than one hour, which en-
ables TLS certificate researchers to readily obtain a large number of TLS certificates.
Moreover, as mentioned in Section 2.2.5, CT becomes a de-facto data source for TLS
certificate research because most TLS certificates are logged after issued [31]. This
is the main distinct difference from the Code-Signing PKI where collecting code
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signing certificates in the wild is significantly challenging since signed executable
binaries and its code signing certificates cannot be readily located.
3.1.2 Identifying Security Problems in the Web PKI
Using the TLS certificates collected by Rapid7 and ZMap, Durumeric et al. [42]
have uncovered the bad practices on leaf TLS certificates and CA (intermediate)
certificates that can impact on the security of the HTTPS ecosystem. For example,
50% of trusted leaf TLS certificates have an insecure 1024-bit RSA key. Also, CAs
still sign their issued TLS certificate using MD even in April 2013.
There was a significant critical vulnerability in OpenSSL that can leak private
keys of certificates, called Heartbleed. Two measurement studies [43, 44] regarding
the impacts of the OpenSSL vulnerability on the HTTPS ecosystem. They found
that 11% of HTTPS sites in the Alexa 1 Million websites still have the HeartBleed
vulnerability, two days after disclosure. Moreover, 14% re-isssued TLS certificates
still have the same the private keys that were likely leaked. Cangialosi et al. found
that many websites share their private key with Content Delivery Networks (CDNs)
or hosting providers, and they also manage their customers’ private keys instead
of the key owners [45]. Researchers have also focused on the revocation of TLS
certificates. Liu et al. found that many revoked certificates were used, and web
browsers failed to check the revocation of the certificates [46].
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Figure 3.1: Green padlock example.
3.1.3 Phishing Attacks using TLS Certificates
3.1.3.1 Phishing Attacks
Phishing attacks are being widely used by adversaries to steal victims’ cre-
dentials such as passwords and user IDs. Typically, adversaries mimic legitimate
websites such as Paypal, Google, Facebook, etc. and lure a victim to input their
credentials. Phishing attacks are often delivered to victims through phishing emails,
social network message, and SMS [47–49].
Phishing attacks have been well studied: particularly, squatting phishing do-
mains [50–53]. Specifically, in these phishing studies, they measured how many the
squatting techniques have been exploited in the wild. Tian et al. [54] found that
657K domains (out of 224 million DNS records) that likely impersonated 702 brands
using squatting phishing domain techniques.
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3.1.3.2 Phishing Attacks with TLS Certificates
In most modern web browsers such as Chrome and Firefox, a padlock or green
padlock icon is displayed for users to indicate the authenticity of a website that they
access and their communicates are encrypted. However, users tend to misperceive
the green padlock displayed in web browsers. They misunderstand that websites are
benign and legitimate when a green padlock icon appears in web browsers.
Specifically, prior works [15–18] revealed that 1) even some users think HTTPS
can protect against phishing attacks, 2) user believe that HTTPS means the trust-
worthiness of websites, and 3) also they perceive the green padlock as an indicator
of trusted and safe websites.
These mis-perceptions and misunderstandings are able to help users to be
tricked by phishing websites deployed with valid TLS certificates. Anti-Phishing
Working Group (APGW) recently reported that approximately 60% of phishing
websites are served with TLS certificates [19], which means that more phishing
websites with TLS certificates appear in the wild than plain HTTP phishing web-
sites.
However, HTTPS phishing attacks have been little studied. If we better un-
derstand the current landscape of HTTPS phishing attacks, we can mitigate the
HTTPS phishing attacks as well as eventually improve the security of the Web PKI.
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3.2 Measurements of the Code Signing PKI Abuse
Comparing to the Web’s PKI, little is known about the code signing abuse.
In the first attempt [10], F-Secure in 2010 introduced the ways to abuse Microsoft
Authenticode. However, the work was not an officially peer-reviewed paper, rather
presentation slides focusing on the introductions of new security threats in Authen-
ticode.
Sophos also discussed the code signing abuse [11]. They measured digitally
signed Windows PE malicious files collected from 2008 to April 2010. In this work,
they found that the majority of signed malicious files were fake AV malware, fol-
lowed by Spyware and Adware. The fake AV malware was signed with certificates
legitimately issued from CAs.
Kotzias et al. [12] in 2015 examined 356,000 digitally signed executable files
collected between 2006 and 2015. They observed that most of the signed malicious
files are Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUPs), but signed malware is little found
in their data sets.
Alrawi et al. [13] also conducted a measurement study of signed malicious files
and malicious code signing certificates. In their work, they attempted to understand
the abuse of code signing certificates misused to sign malware samples using 3 million
malware samples. However, their analysis was based on all certificates even used
not only for malware and for PUP or ADware.
Unlike the Authenticode code signing that obtains a certificate from a CA,
Android applications are signed with self-signed certificates; thus, there is no effec-
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tive revocation system. Many Android developers use the same key for their many
applications, which can lead to unexpected security threats such as signature-based
permissions [55].
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Chapter 4: Understanding TLS (HTTPS) Phishing Attacks
In this chapter1, we present how adversaries (i.e., phishing attacks) obtain TLS
certificates from CAs for their phishing attacks and how the issuing CAs perform
revocations against the compromised and/or misused TLS certificates.
4.1 Motivation
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [56, 57]—previously, Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL)—was designed and deployed for secure communication in untrusted networks
such as the Internet. As of April 2020, more than 90% Internet traffic is securely
made over TLS [6], which means that most people use TLS for secure communication
with other people or websites such as online banking services.
TLS relies on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the authenticity of entities
whom others want to securely communicate, which called the Web PKI. In the
Web PKI, besides clients and servers (i.e., service providers), there is also trusted
third-parties, called Certificate Authorities (CAs) who issue TLS certificates after
verifying applicants’ identities or the ownership of domains. The TLS certificate
includes an applicant’s (i.e., server’s) public key and binds the public key to the
1This paper is in submission [1].
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server’s domain. In turn, clients can establish trust in the issued TLS certificates
by verifying certificates, and check if they access the domain specified in the verified
TLS certificate.
In most modern web browsers such as Chrome and Firefox, a gray or green
padlock icon is displayed for clients to indicate the authenticity of a website that
they access and their communicates are encrypted. Technically, the green padlock
icon means that the authenticity and integrity of a website that a user accesses are
guaranteed. In other words, the icon is completely not related to the legitimacy
or benignity of a website. However, many people tend to incorrectly believe that
the meaning of a green padlock icon. They often misperceive that the websites are
benign and legitimate if such a green padlock icon is displayed in the URL bars of
their browsers. Prior works have shown that even worse, some users consider TLS
(or HTTPS) as a defense against phishing attacks [15–18].
These misperceiving and misunderstanding are able to increase the chance
for users to be tricked by phishing websites deployed with valid TLS certificates
because the valid TLS certificate will be rendered as a green padlock icon in the
URL bar. Particularly, Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) has reported that
approximately more than 60% of phishing websites are launched with TLS certifi-
cates in the 1st quarter of 2019 [19]. Comparatively, in 2016, only less than 2% of
phishing websites had TLS certificates. This indicates that over three years, the
number of phishing websites with TLS certificates has significantly grown. There-
fore, now more phishing websites with TLS certificates appear in the wild than the
plain HTTP phishing websites. In this regard, we need to better understand the
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current landscape of TLS phishing attacks, which leads to the enhancement of the
security of the Web PKI.
In this chapter, we attempt to understand the current landscape of HTTPS
(i.e., TLS) phishing threats. We first analyze 5.05M phishing URLs collected from
eCrimeX, a blacklist of phishing URLs operated by Anti-Phishing Working Group
(APWG). Next, we conduct investigations on the usage of TLS certificates in phish-
ing websites and the ecosystem of the TLS CAs. The collected dataset provides two
insights on TLS certificates used for phishing attacks in the wild: (1) CAs rarely
revoke abusive certificates and (2) a CA’s vetting process can fail. Two organiza-
tion validation (OV) certificates are issued to adversaries and misused in phishing
attacks.
4.2 Landscape of TLS (HTTPS) Phishing Websites
In this section, we study TLS-based phishing websites to better understand
how adversaries abuse the Web PKI (TLS and HTTPS) by deploying their phishing
websites with TLS certificates.
4.2.1 Dataset Collection
We collect 5.05 Million phishing URLs from a phishing website blacklist web-
site, operated by Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) [58]. This observation




Distinct HTTPS GSB Total Valid Expired
5,053,705 675,387 301,555 67,830 216,587 90,935 125,652
*Expiration and revocation status were checked on Oct. 1st, 2019.
Table 4.1: Summary of TLS Phishing website datasets. We collect HTTPS
phishing URLs and certificates from Mar. 12th, 2017 to Oct. 1st, 2019 (30 months).
HTTPS denotes the total number of phishing FQDNs deployed with HTTPS. GSB
denotes the number of distinct domains blacklisted in Google Safe Browsing. Valid
denotes that certificates are valid in terms of validity period; thus, even revoked
certificates also belong to this category [1].
4.2.1.1 Collections of Abusive TLS certificates
The simplest way to obtain TLS certificates is accessing websites and down-
loading the TLS certificates from the websites. However, because most phishing
websites have ephemeral lifetime after blacklisted [59], the simplest way is unavail-
able at the time of accessing the blacklisted phishing websites and downloading
their TLS certificates from the phishing websites. Therefore, Certificate Trans-
parency (CT) is utilized. CT is designed and deployed for auditing purposes when
TLS certificates are issued [60] so that CT logs TLS certificates immediately after
they are issued. This means that all abusive TLS certificates misused for phishing
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websites are able to be obtained even though these phishing websites are no longer
alive.
We first extract distinct domain names from the 5.05M phishing URLS black-
listed in APWG. 675.4K distinct Fully-Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) are found
in the 5.05M URLs as described in Table 4.1. Of them, we observe that 301.6K
(44.6%) FQDNs are deployed with the HTTPS protocol, which means they use TLS
certificates. We then query CT with the distinct FQDNs and obtain 216.6K (71.8%
out of 301.6K) X.509 TLS certificates from the CT logs.
The free web hosting services such as 000webhostapp.com and the free online
form builder service such as typeform.com are not observed in the CT logs. This is
because these free online services utilize wildcard TLS certificates (e.g., *.000web-
hostapp.com). Therefore, all sub-domains belonging to the free online service do-
mains are not logged in the CT logs.
Only 42.0% TLS certificates are valid on October 1st, 2019. In other words,
58.0% TLS certificates have already expired and are no longer valid. This is mainly
because automated CAs (ACME CAs such as Let’s Encrypt and cPanel) issue TLS
certificates whose lifetime is 90 days. Surprisingly, only 2.3% certificates have been
revoked among these valid TLS certificates (more details are discussed in Subsec-
tion 4.2.5).
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4.2.2 Google Safe Browsing
Google Safe Browsing (GSB) is the most prevalent anti-phishing technique,
operated by Google. This technique is by default enabled in Google Chrome, Apple
Safari, and Mozilla Firefox. When a user accesses a phishing website blacklisted
by GSB, GSB blocks the access to the phishing website and displays a red warning
webpage to the user.
We observe that only 17.1% phishing URLs (861,022 URLs out of 5.05M URLs)
are blacklisted in GSB; the most phishing URLs are not blacklisted in GSB. In other
words, users can still be exposed to the most phishing URLs (approximately 83%
phishing URLs) although these phishing URLs have already been publicly available
in the wild, which essentially echoes the observation in prior work [61]. In the study,
they observed that the blacklist such as Google Safe Browsing mechanism is often
ineffective.
Google Safe Browsing sometimes blacklists only URLs, not the FQDNs of the
URLs. In the dataset, 124,260 distinct FQDNs are extracted from the blacklisted
861,022 phishing URLs. We again query Google Safe Browsing with the distinct
124,260 FQDNs, and find that only 113,344 of them are blacklisted. This means
that 10,916 FQDNs (8.8% out of 124,260 FQDNs) are not blacklisted while its URLs
are blacklisted.
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4.2.2.1 HTTPS vs. HTTP
We compare the HTTPS phishing FQDNs with the plain HTTP phishing
FQDNs. We find that HTTPS phishing FQDNs are more likely blacklisted in Google
Safe Browsing then the plain HTTP phishing FQDNs. Specifically, only 22.5%
(67,830) FQDNs of the distinct 301K HTTPS FQDNs are blacklisted in Google
Safe Browsing while only 12.3% (45,814 out of 374K FQDNs) plain HTTP FQDNs
are blacklisted in GSB.
4.2.2.2 Revocation
We query CT with the 67,830 FQDNs and find that 36,623 (54%) TLS cer-
tificates in the CT logs. We then check the revocation statuses of the 36,623 TLS
certificates; 46.9% (17,194) TLS certificates already expired. Only 2.7% (519 out
of 19,429) TLS certificates are explicitly revoked. In short, the domains blacklisted
in GSB are hardly revoked and even though this blacklist information is publicly
available, CAs may not utilize Google Safe Browsing to monitor their issued TLS
certificates and check whether their TLS certificates are misused. More details are
discussed in Subsection 4.2.5.
4.2.3 Squatting Domains
The primary goal of phishing attacks is to deceive users by impersonating the
benign, legitimate webpages of online banking services, government departments,
etc. Domain name squatting is one of the common impersonation techniques. Specif-
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ically, adversaries leverage this technique to make victims confused with currently
popular brands [52, 53]. For example, paypall.com is a squatting domain for the
legitimate paypal.com—observe the additional ‘l’ in the squatting domain.
We conduct a comparison of HTTP squatting domains and HTTPS squatting
domains. To identify squatting domains, We utilize the techniques from a prior
work [50]. Then, we further measure how many squatting domain names exist in the
domain names that use TLS certificates for HTTPS by comparing to domain names
with HTTP. Particularly, squatting domain names typically share many overlapping
letters with targeted legitimate domain names. We observe that only 3.81% of the
domains with HTTPS (out of 378,747) are the squatting domains.
4.2.4 OV & EV Certificates
Recall that there are typically three types of TLS certificates: Domain Vali-
dation (DV) certificates, Organization Validation (OV) certificates, and Extended
Validation (EV) certificates. DV TLS certificates are issued only after CAs check
the ownership of domains that will be included in certificates. However, OV and EV
TLS certificates need more strict applicants’ vetting process because their organiza-
tion information such as company name is specified in OV or EV TLS certificates.
Therefore, CAs should verify domain ownership as well as business registration us-
ing certified documents such as government-issued business registration documents.
This means that due to the strictness, adversaries (e.g., phishing attackers) have
more challenges to obtain OV or EV TLS certificates than DV certificates. How-
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ever, if they obtain OV or EV certificates, the phishing websites with the issued OV
or EV certificate can increase trust for victims (clients) by providing the victims
with the legal information of organizations.
4.2.4.1 OV & EV Certificate in Phishing Websites
Adversaries may want to launch phishing websites with OV or EV TLS cer-
tificates because these websites with more trustful certificates can present a higher
level of trust to phishing victims. In turn, victims can readily establish trust in the
phishing websites with OV or EV TLS certificates since these websites display more
trustful icon and organizations’ information (such as company name) to the victims.
However, obtaining OV or EV TLS certificates from CAs is significantly chal-
lenging for adversaries (i.e., phishing attackers). This is because the issuance of OV
or EV TLS certificates requires more strict vetting process. In other words, ad-
versaries need to submit their government-issued documents regarding company or
organization information. For example, they need to incorporate shell companies to
pass the strict vetting process, which requires more time and effort such as finances.
We raise a research question that how many OV and EV TLS certificates
are misused for phishing attacks. We observe that totally 598 TLS certificates
are misused for phishing websites in the dataset (Table 4.1); specifically, 294 OV
and 304 EV TLS certificates. Most TLS certificates are blacklisted because benign
web servers had become compromised and phishing websites are co-hosted in the
compromised web servers after being exploited vulnerabilities. In other words, the
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OV or EV certificates are not intentionally issued for phishing attacks.
Besides the compromised web server attacks, we find that two OV certificates
in the dataset may be issued directly to adversaries. The two OV TLS certificates
are misused in Paypal phishing attacks, which was confirmed by Paypal. One of
the two OV TLS certificates contains a Paypal squatting domain in the Subject
Alternative Names (SAN) filed and another OV certificate has a Paypal squatting
domain as a common name.
Other squatting domains found in the SAN field from the OV TLS certificates
are Google and Facebook as seen in Table 4.2. The parent domain was registered
in January 2015. We find that 119 phishing URLs that contain the domain in the
dataset. The parent domain contains multiple sub-domains such as “hrmy.mtbank”,
“saayantan”, “aruntest,” which are followed by “paypal.com”, “google.com”, “face-
book.com”—e.g., paypal.com.hrmy.mtbank.###.net (the parent domain is masked
with ###).
4.2.4.2 Threat Model for Abusive OV TLS Certificate
To better understand the adversaries behaviors—for example, how they lever-
age OV TLS certificates—we query CT again for the parent domain (###.net).
Additional 4,843 OV certificates under the same the parent domain have been issued
with numerous sub-domains. The first issuance of the OV TLS certificates happened
in January 2015 and the latest issuance was in October 2019. This indicates that
the adversaries have kept exploiting the CA after the parent domain was registered
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Table 4.2: X.509 v3 Subject Alternative Names (SAN) in the two OV
TLS certificates. The parent domain name is masked as #### [1].
in January 2015. Every OV TLS certificate has a number of Subject Alternative
Names (SAN) for their phishing attack targets: for example, outlook.com, box.com,
google.com, facebook.com, slack.com, etc.
Moreover, we investigate how the adversaries can obtain these numerous abu-
sive OV TLS certificates. The easiest way for them is to pay for the all OV TLS
certificates, but it requires quite a bit money. For example, the OV certificates have
43
been issued from a certain CA, and the CA charges $349 and an additional $99
for each sub-domain in the SAN field. As described in Table 4.2, the abusive OV
TLS certificate #1 has eleven SANs, and in total, the single OV certificate costs
$1,438. Therefore, they are unlikely motivated to purchase the expensive OV TLS
certificates using their own money. Therefore, we suspect that they may use their
own stable supply chain or exploit some vulnerabilities of the CA vetting process.
This is because if they purchased the all OV certificates out of their own pocket,
they need to totally pay approximately $4.8M (4,843 abusive OV TLS certificates ∗
$1,000) when an OV certificate with SANs is purchased at $1,0002.
We present a few feasible scenarios regarding how the adversaries obtain the
abusive OV TLS certificates. First, the phishing attackers may utilize stolen finan-
cial information such as stolen credit cards. However, as mentioned before, the total
cost of the all abusive OV certificates is approximately $4.8M. It is very difficult
that such financial transactions can be successfully made without being detected by
banks since the total cost is tremendous. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to
pass every vetting process where humans are involved to check applicants’ identities;
totally, the adversaries need to pass the 4,843 strict vetting process since each OV
TLS certificate requires a human-involved vetting process. Second, another feasible
scenario is that the adversaries compromise the CA’s issuance process including the
vetting process and/or exploit some vulnerabilities in the issuance process.
While being unclear how the adversaries obtain the 4,843 OV certificates for
their phishing attacks, it is the fact that the CA obviously failed to check high-risk
2Note that that is an underestimation
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certificate requests that include the domain names of target attacks such as pay-
pal.com. Moreover, these OV TLS certificates have been not revoked yet, which
indicates that the CA also failed to proactively discover their issued TLS certifi-
cates that are misused for phishing attacks. Also, users still remain exposed to the
phishing attacks with the OV TLS certificates that increase the trust of phishing
websites.
4.2.5 Revocation of TLS Certificates for Phishing Websites
Revocation is the final defense against the abusive TLS certificates; the issuing
CAs make the compromised or abusive TLS certificates no longer valid. We check
the revocation statuses of the all certificates in the datasets that are misused for
phishing attacks.
There are two predominant methods to disseminate revocation information
to clients as discussed in Subsection 4.2.5: OCSP and CRLs. OCSP is always
preferred over CRLs in terms of checking revocation status so that we first check
the revocation statuses of the abusive TLS certificates using OCSP after we filter
out expired TLS certificates. However, we occasionally experience that the OCSP
responders were unavailable or provided OCSP responses as prior work [62, 63] has
revealed that OCSP responders are improperly managed and operated. In this case,
CRLs are used as a complement way to retrieve revocation information. If both are
unavailable, we consider them as error.
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4.2.5.1 Revocation Rate
Averagely, only 2.3% of TLS certificates in the dataset misused for phishing
attacks have been revoked as described in Table 4.3. This means that CAs hardly
perform revocations for the abusive TLS certificates.
Interestingly, there is a distinct pattern between automated (ACME) CAs
(e.g., Let’s Encrypt and cPanel) and commercial CAs (e.g., DigiCert, Comodo, Go-
Daddy, etc.). Specifically, the automated CAs have lower revocation rates comparing
to commercial CAs; GoDaddy has the highest revocation rate (31.4%).
The extremely lower revocation rate indicates that CAs rarely investigate their
issued TLS certificates that are being misused for phishing attacks. As a result, users







Let’s Encrypt 110,670 40,931 64 69,632 0.16%
cPanel 71,890 22,893 111 48,866 0.48%
Comodo 11,136 6,114 328 4,694 5.09%
CloudFlare 10,509 10,092 0 416 0.00%
Go Daddy 5,286 3,122 1,430 734 31.41%
DigiCert 2,251 1,911 16 324 0.83%
RapidSSL 622 497 5 120 1.00%
TrustAsia 669 603 1 65 0.17%
GlobalSign 617 502 11 104 2.14%
GeoTrust 571 458 8 105 1.72%
Etc. 2,366 1,630 144 592 8.12%
Total 216,587 88,817 2,118 125,652 2.34%
*Expiration and revocation status were checked on Oct. 1st, 2019.
*64 certificates are excluded due to OCSP response errors.
Table 4.3: Revocation statuses of top-ten CAs’ certificates. 59.6% cer-
tificates already expired as of Oct. 1st, 2019. Of the valid 40.4% certificates, on
average, only about 2.3% certificates have been revoked. Interestingly, only Go
Daddy revoked about 31% of certificates used for phishing websites. Other CAs
barely revoked certificates [1].
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Chapter 5: Understanding Adversary Behavior and Security Threats
in the Code-Signing PKI
In this Chapter1, we attempt to study the security threats in the Code-Signing
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). We begin with the motivation about why we need
to study the Code-Signing PKI (Section 5.1). The Code-Signing PKI has an in-
herent challenge of collecting code signing certification. To overcome the challenge,
we utilize multiple datasets that can be representative such as WINE (Section 5.2).
First, we fully characterize the weaknesses of the Code-Signing PKI that adver-
saries potentially are able to exploit; specifically, we mainly focus the three actors—
certificate authorities, software publishers, and end-users (Section 5.3). Them we
try to understand the underground economy of code signing certificates (Section 5.4)
Finally, we measure the effectiveness of the primary defense, revocation against the
Code-Signing PKI abuses (Section 5.5). We made the results and datasets publicly




The establishment of a trust in software distributed over the Internet is chal-
lenging due to the nature of software distribution; 1) we are unable to identify
publishers and 2) there is a chance for the software to be tampered during distribu-
tion. In other words, the software can be readily altered for malicious purposes by
adversaries such as inserting a malicious payload into the legitimate software.
To guarantee the authenticity and integrity of software, the digital signature
mechanism is utilized, called code signing. A software publisher signs her/his soft-
ware to distribute with her/his own private key never shared with others. In turn, a
client verifies the digital signature with the public keys associated with the private
key.
Another problem inherent in code signing is how we can attest that the pub-
lic key associated with the private key legitimately belongs to the software pub-
lisher. To resolve this issue, code signing relies on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI),
called the Code-Signing PKI. Similar to other PKIs such as the Web’s PKI, the
Code-Signing PKI requires Certificate Authorities (CAs) to certify a code signing
certificate belongs to a legitimate publisher.
The CAs issue code signing certificates after verifying the publishers. The
publishers use the issued code signing certificates to sign their software to provide
the integrity and authenticity of their software. Clients are able to establish trust in
the signed software by verifying the signed software with the public key embedded
in the code signing certificates. Then, they can know who publishes the software
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and the software is never altered after signed.
Unfortunately, anecdotal evidence has proved that the software properly signed
by legitimate publishers can be critical malware. For example, Stuxnet [14, 64] is
malware properly signed with two private keys of the two reputable Taiwanese semi-
conductor companies. The private keys were likely stolen to sign the malware since
the two companies are very reputable and never believed to be involved in the ma-
licious activity. The code signing certificates of the two reputable companies helped
remain undetected for a longer period than other malware [14]. Another exam-
ple is the Flame malware properly signed with a Microsoft code signing certificate.
However, the certificate was not legitimately issued from a CA; rather it was a
counterfeit code signing certificate generated by exploiting the MD5 chosen-prefix
collision attack [65]. Moreover, a fraudulent certificate was issued by a CA due to
CAs’ verification failures. In 2001, VeriSign erroneously issued two code signing
certificates under the name of Microsoft Corporation to an adversary who claimed
to be an employee of Microsoft [66].
However, little research on the code signing abuse has been conducted; there-
fore, the security threats and challenges inherent in the code signing PKI are not
understood well. Rather, prior work focuses on Potentially Unwanted Programs
(PUPs) signed with code signing certificates issued legitimately from CAs [14,64,65].
In particular, 1) weaknesses in the code signing PKI are not systemically examined
and how these weaknesses can lead to the breaches of the trust in the code signing
PKI. Second, 2) there is no understanding of the adversaries’ behaviors; specifically,
how adversaries obtain code signing certificates misused for malware (Section 5.4).
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Lastly, 3) the primary defense against these abuses, revocation is not fully under-
stood.
In this chapter, we conduct a measurement study of these challenges and
security threats inherent in the Code-Signing PKI. Particularly, to answer the first
challenge, we devise a system and an algorithm to identify the weakness in the Code-
Signing PKI, and how this weakness can lead to the breaches of the trust in the
PKI (see Section 5.3). To better understand the malware authors and black market
vendors, we measure the black market for code signing certificate (see Section 5.4).
Lastly, the primary defense against the code signing abuse is revocation. To see if the
revocation is effective, we examine the current revocation process (see Section 5.5).
5.2 Overview of the Data Sources
In this section, we provide an overview of the data collection for measurement
studies of the code signing PKI abuses: such as how we collected the dataset and
what the challenges are inherent in for the code signing certificate collection.
5.2.1 Worldwide Intelligence Network Environment (WINE)
WINE [67] is a platform that collects data from about 10.9 million real end-
hosts around the world who have installed Symantec products and opted in the
agreement for sharing their data with Symantec; but, identifiable clients information
has been not collected. Particularly, the collected datasets are clients’ download and
installation activities.
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From the WINE dataset, we extract 1) the hash values (SHA256), 2) the
server-side event timestamps, 3) the publisher names of the downloaded/installed
executables on the end-hosts. However, the WINE dataset does not include more
information than the extracted ones such as code signing certificates information.
Therefore, we are unable to distinguish between executable files with the same
publisher names; particularly, when executable files are signed with different code
signing certificates that belong to the same publishers. To overcome this challenge,
we utilize another service that provides more detailed information about executable
files, called VirusTotal (Section 5.2.2.1). The WINE dataset is used for Section 5.3
and Section 5.5.
5.2.2 Ground Truth Data
5.2.2.1 VirusTotal
VirusTotal2 is a web service that allows us to scan executable files with up to
70 anti-virus (AV) engines, and also provides us with more detailed information of
scanned executable files such as code signing certificate information.
As mentioned in Section 5.2.1, the WINE dataset does not provide the code
signing certificate information such as serial numbers, issue dates, expiration dates,
etc. To collect this information about code signing certificates used to signed exe-
cutable files in the WINE dataset, we query VirusTotal [68]. Additionally, we also
query VirusTotal for the first-submission timestamps to VirusTotal, the number of
2https://www.virustotal.com/
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AV engines that classified the executable files as malware, the labels of malware.
5.2.2.2 OpenCorporates
OpenCorporates3 is a website that provides the largest open database of busi-
nesses in the world; approximately 100 million companies. We use this open database
to check if the publishers found in malicious code signing certificates are legitimate
(Section 5.3).
5.2.2.3 HerdProtect
To better understand the reputation of publishers (software companies), we
utilize HerdProtect4; particularly, the publisher information (location, business type,
etc.) and whether the publisher has been released Potentially Unwanted Programs
(PUPs) are queried.
5.2.3 Code Signing Certificates
The code signing certificate information provided from VirusTotal (Section 5.2.2.1)
includes only issue dates, expiration date, serial numbers, and issuers (CAs). This
information, however, is not enough for the measurement study of revocation (Sec-
tion 5.5) since the measurements in this work require the information of the dissem-
ination channels for revocation status. Therefore, for more information from code




One of the main challenges in collecting code signing certificates is that there
are no publicly available repositories or datasets; while in TLS, censys.io provides
the TLS certificates or TLS certificates can be readily collected through network
scanners such as ZMap [41]. To overcome this challenge, we utilize multiple data sets
publicly released from prior research, Malcert [13], and Malsign [12], and Symantec’s
proprietary repository of binary samples.
5.2.3.1 Revocation Information
As discussed in Section 2.3.4, the revocation status information is mainly dis-
seminated over two mechanisms: 1) CRLs and 2) OCSP. Clients have to access CAs’
dissemination servers through the URLs of the two mechanisms specified at CRLD-
istributionPoints and AuthorityInfoAccess extensions respectively in x509 v3 code
signing certificates [23]. We extract CRLs and OCSP URLs from the 145,582 leaf
code signing certificates. Most certificates (137,027, 94.1%) have both CRLs and
OCSP URLs; only CRLs URLs are specified in 7,794 (5.3%) code signing certificates
and only OCSP points are embedded in 98 (0.06%) certificates. However, the CRLs
can be used for other purposes such as TLS; thus we manually remove them, which
remains only CRLs used for code singing PKI.
5.2.3.2 Revocation Publication Date List
A CRL file includes the serial numbers of revoked code signing certificates,
revocation date, and revocation reason. The revocation date is rather an effective
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revocation date (tr), not revocation publication date. The effective revocation date
determines the validity of signed executable files.
To collect the revocation publication date(tp), we devise a system, called revo-
cation publication date collection system. The system collects revoked serial num-
bers once a day from the CRLs data set. This information can be utilized to measure
the revocation delay, how long CAs take to revoke compromised certificates.
5.3 Understanding of Code Signing Abuse
Compromised code signing certificates have used for advanced threats; for
example, Stuxnet that included device drivers signed with likely stolen private
keys stolen from two Taiwanese semiconductor companies [14]. Flame exploited
a chosen-prefix collision attack against the MD5 hash [65]. Both examples indicate
that the valid digital signature can help the malware evade detection and bypass
AV engines.
Prior anecdotal information tells that many malware may carry valid digi-
tal signatures from compromised certificates [14, 64, 65]. However, these security
threats have been little explored systematically. The previous research focuses on
signed Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUPs), such as adware. The PUPs are
typically signed with certificates legitimately issued from CAs. Therefore, the prior
research does not distinguish between certificates legitimately issued to publishers
and compromised certificates such as stolen certificates.
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In this work5, we conduct a systematic measurement study of threats that
can breach the trust inherent in the Windows Code-Signing PKI. we focus on only
signed malware, not PUPs.
In short, the contributions are the followings.
1. We proposed a threat model with three classes of weaknesses that an adver-
sary can exploit (1) inadequate client-side protections, 2) publisher-side key
mismanagement, and 3) CA-side verification failures).
2. We analyzed how long users are exposed to these security threats.
5.3.1 Measurement Methods
In this section, to better understand the code signing abuse, we describe 1)
what data sources are used, 2) what the pipeline for this work is, 3) how to label
signed malware, and 4) a new abuse detection algorithm.
5.3.1.1 Binary Labeling
It is important to classify and label binary samples and to distinguish signed
malware from signed benign and signed Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUPs)
since, in this work, we conservatively focus on only signed malware that exploits the
code signing abuse.
For malware, we utilized the previous approach proposed in Kown’s work [69].




















Figure 5.1: Data analysis pipeline [2]
(AV) engines that flag the samples as malware. we set cmal ≥ 20 as the threshold for
malware. To be more conservative, we add another factor, rpup that is the number of
AV engines that detect as PUPs. In short, we consider a binary sample is malware
if the sample has cmal ≥ 20 and rpup ≤ 10%. For example, if a binary sample is
detected as malware by more than 20 AV engines and another less than 10% of AVs
detect it as PUPs, the binary is considered as malware.
Classifying benign binary samples is also required for the new abuse detection
algorithm (Section 5.3.1.3). Similar to the approach for detecting malware, if a
binary sample is cmal = 0, we consider it a benign sample.
5.3.1.2 System Overview
As shown in Figure 5.1, the data collection and analysis requires four steps: 1)
seed data collection, 2) filtering data, 3) input data preparation, and 4) identifying
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potentially abusive code signing certificates.
Seed data collection. The data collection for this work starts with the unique
SHA256 hashes of binary files from the AV telemetry data sets in WINE. We first
exclude the hashes of binary samples that are not related to any malicious activities
such as hacking tools or adware. This is because we have limited access to query
VirusTotal with the hashes for the reports. We also add a list of hashes of known
malicious binaries separately provided by Symantec. Then, we join this list with the
binary reputation scheme in Symantec to figure out which binary files are digitally
signed. This remains a list of potentially signed and malicious binary files.
Filtering data. The list of potentially signed and malicious binary files generated
from the previous step may contain benign files or PUPs. Therefore, we first filter
out PUPs using three ways, 1) we remove from the list the PUP publishers identified
in prior work [12, 69–71]. 2) Then, we query HerdProtect (see Section 5.2.2.3) with
all publisher names (i.e., common names in code signing certificates), and if the
publisher names are found and classified as PUP publishers in the web service, we
also exclude them. 3) Finally, we pick ten binary samples for each publisher name
and filter out them if at least one of the binary samples is classified as PUPs as
discussed in Section 5.3.1.1.
Input data preparation. We query VirusTotal with the filtered hashes, which
returns VirusTotal reports that contain detailed information such as code signing
certificates (serial numbers, issue date, and expiration date) and AV detection and
labels for each binary samples. Binary samples are considered as signed malware
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if 1) properly signed, and 2) the labels for the binary samples are malware as pre-
sented in Section 5.3.1.1. Note that in this step, there may be malware samples
improperly signed with malformed signatures. After this step, we join the SHA-256
hashes with binary reputation scheme in WINE, which results in a list of potentially
benign binary samples and malware samples that signed with the same code signing
certificates. Then, we finally query VirusTotal again with this list, and we utilize
the VirusTotal reports to identify benign and malicious samples.
Identifying potentially abusive certificates. In the last step, for each code
signing certificates misused to sign malware, we use the abuse detection algorithm
(described in the below Section) to identify how they are abused.
5.3.1.3 Abuse Detection Algorithm
Recall that in the third step (Section 5.3.1.2) of the pipeline where binary
samples can carry malformed digital signatures. The malformed digital signatures
can be obviously verified since the signatures do not match the hash values of the
binary samples. Rather, the malformed signatures were likely copied from other
signed binary samples. In this case, the adversaries do not have code signing certifi-
cates to sign their malware, but they attempt to make their malware samples look
like being signed.
Besides the binary samples with malformed signatures, other samples identified
by the pipeline may be properly signed with code signing certificates that can be still





















Figure 5.2: Flowchart of the abuse detection algorithm [2]. We consider code
signing certificate are stolen when only signed malware is found in each cluster.
Otherwise, when signed malware and benign executable binaries are found in each
cluster, we consider them as the fraudulent or shell company case.
We first group the binary samples by each code signing certificates. A publisher can
have multiple signed binary samples and the binary samples can be grouped into
multiple pools. Each group may consist of 1) only signed benign samples, 2) only
signed malware, or 3) both signed malware and benign samples. To expand the
data set, we utilize HerdProtect and query the web service with each code signing
certificate’s serial number.
For each certificate misused for malware, we then infer the corresponding abuse
types using the algorithm illustrated in Figure 5.2. There are three types of code
signing abuses, and they are explained in detail.
Compromised certificates. A compromised code signing certificate is initially
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issued to a legitimate, benign software publisher, and then the code signing certifi-
cate is misused to sign malware after the private key associated with the certificate
is compromised such as stolen. Consequently, we expect the two types of binary
samples are found in a certain certificate group; the two types are 1) benign binary
samples signed and released by the legitimate publisher and 2) malicious samples
signed and released by the malware authors who steal the private key. In each group,
we further investigate the trusted timestamps to know the timeline of the abuse.
Identity theft & shell companies. In this case, malware authors obtain code
signing certificates to sign their malware by convincing CAs. We believe that there is
no motivation for them to sign benign samples and release signed ones. Therefore,
we expect to see only signed malware found in a certain certificate’s group. To
distinguish between the two cases of identity theft and a shell company, we utilize
OpenCorporates and HerdProtect. In particular, if a publisher is found in the two
web services and its locality address in its code signing certificate does match the
information in the web services, we suspect the publisher is a victim of identity
theft.
Verification. We are able to reliably identify all signed binary samples with a
malformed digital signature using the VirusTotal reports. we run an experiment to
determine whether these signatures help bypass the protections for clients such as
AV engines. Of all types of code signing abuses, we have a high degree of confi-
dence in the determination that a code signing certificate is compromised since we
are able to observe that the compromised certificate is likely utilized by multiple
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Cert. Desc. (Error code) Total Malware
Properly
Valid 130,053 109
Revoked (0x800b010c) 4,276 43
Expired (0x800b0101) 17,330 37
Total 151,659 189
Malformed
Bad Digest (0x80096010) 1,880 101
Others 81 0
Parsing Error 233 35
Total 2,194 136
Total 153,853 325
Table 5.1: Property of the certificates [2].
actors. However, for some compromised code signing certificates, we are not able
to determine it because we cannot collect all benign binary samples in the wild.
Similarly, we also have a higher degree of confidence in the identity theft than in
shell companies since some publishers’ information can be not found in the two web
services (OpenCorporates and HerdProtect) we utilize. To be more conservative in
verifying the results, we manually analyze their timeline and contact the publishers
and CAs to confirm the findings.
5.3.2 Measurement Results
5.3.2.1 Summary of the Input Data
In this section, we summarize the input data in each step described in Sec-
tion 5.3.1.2. Of 70,293,533 unique binary samples from the AV telemetry reports,
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only 1,053,114 binary samples have the binary signer information in the binary repu-
tation data set, which means that 1 out of 67 binaries are considered as signed. Note
that this is the number of randomly sampled files since we have no visibility into
all signed malware targeted on end-hosts in the world, and other AV engines may
differently handle the digital signatures. However, WINE is the most representative
data set collected by Symantec [72], one of the largest security vendors.
We first filter out potentially unwanted programs (PUPs) as described in Sec-
tion 5.3.1.2, which remains 526,487 unique signed binaries (hashes). To be more
conservatively, we further reduce the number of the signed binaries by filtering out
268,404 executables signed with the 2,648 certificates used for PUPs. After this
step, this yields 258,083 signed binaries. we query VirusTotal with these binary’s
hashes; of these hashes, 88,154 hashes are not found in VirusTotal. we then remove
104,230 samples with a broken chain of code signing certificates, which remains
153,853 signed binary samples in the seed set. To use the abuse detection algorithm
as described in Section 5.3.1.3, we also search for other PUPs in the data set, and
we in total identify 415,377 signed binary samples found in VirusTotal.
As mentioned in Section 5.3.1.1, we set a very conservative number cmal ≥ 20
for the malware detection threshold, which helps identify only obvious malware
samples. Moreover, this small number of signed malware can allow us to examine
every single malware manually. (587 and 1136 binaries are classified as malware
when the threshold is 10 and 5 respectively.) The number of properly signed malware
per year for cmal ≥ 5 is presented in Figure 5.3.














































Figure 5.3: Number of properly signed malware per year (cmal ≥ 5) [2]
messages in the VirusTotal reports. VirusTotal checks the digital signatures using
the sigcheck tool. For example, the sigcheck message, “a certificate was explicitly
revoked by its issuer” indicates that the certificate is no longer valid since it is al-
ready revoked. This error corresponds to the error code “0x800B010C” in Microsoft
Authenticode. Table 5.1 breaks down the validity status. Of 153,853 signed samples,
the 325 samples are classified as signed malware. Of this 325 signed malware, 41.8%
are improperly signed with malformed certificates while 58.2% binaries are properly
signed. Most (74.3%) of improperly signed malware result from bad digests. Of 189
properly signed malware, 22.8% binaries are already revoked, and 19.6% have no
valid trusted timestamps and expired certificates. Almost more than half of them












Go Daddy/StarField 21,410 (0.06%)
Total 38,572,995 (100%)
Table 5.2: The number of binaries signed with code signing certificates
issued by each CA in WINE [2].
5.3.2.2 Code Signing Ecosystem
In this section, we understand the code signing ecosystem using all signed
binaries (both benign and malicious samples) the WINE data set. The numbers
in WINE may be likely biased since all end-hosts run a Symantec product a least.
Therefore, we remove the binaries signed with Symantec and then extract the issuer
name of the digital code signing certificates from 38.6 million binaries. This allows
me to have 210 unique CAs.
CA market share. We utilize the WINE data to better know the market share.
Since we do not have the exact certificate of the signed binaries, we take an indirect
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method to estimate the market share of the CAs: prevalence of the binaries signed by
each CAs. We investigate the file signer information in the binary reputation dataset
in WINE. Table 5.2 breaks down the market share of the top 10 most popular CAs
and the number of unique binary samples signed with the code signing certificates
issued by these CAs. Table 5.2 suggests that Symantec (including VeriSign and
Thawte) is the most popular CA (78%) in the code signing ecosystem; 10.7% 4.1
million binary files either are self-signed or are signed by minor CAs (not included
in Table 5.2). The three (WoSign, Certum, and Startcom) of the top 10 CAs are
not by default trustful in the latest version of Windows 10.
Misuse of code signing certificates for TLS. Code signing and TLS certificates
should not be used for another purpose—for example, code signing certificates can-
not be used for HTTPS. We query for the keywords 6 censys.io [73], a web service
that periodically collects TLS certificates by connecting websites. The keywords ex-
plicitly indicate that the certificates are for code signing usage. We identify 122 code
signing certificates used for TLS. For example, a website, “marketedge.com” in the
Alexa Top 1 Million domains, uses a code signing certificate for the domain without
“www,” but uses a TLS certificate is properly used for the domain with “www.”
It suggests that people including web administrators unlikely tend to differentiate
between the two types of certificates.
Signed installer or application. Code signing best practices [74] recommend
that installers, as well as installed files, are signed. This protects the installed
files from being tampering; for example, adversaries can copy the malicious code
6443.https.tls.certificate.parsed.extensions.extended key usage.code signing:true
66
into the benign files. We examine that the best practice is well followed. The
WINE data set to allow me to determine when binaries files are created on disk
by their parents’ process (typically downloaders or installers). We extract install
and download events by employing the binary reputation dataset in WINE, which
helps identify 25,051,415 unique installation and download events by counting the
unique installer and downloader and payload pairs in the dataset. In these events,
2,946,950 events (11.8% ) have both the signed installer and signed downloader and
the signed payloads, and 666,350 events (2.66%) have installer and downloader and
the payloads signed by the same publisher; meanwhile, 19,752,592 unique unsigned
files were installed by the downloaders and installers.
5.3.2.3 Malformed Digital Signatures
In the data set, 101 binary samples are invalid, which means that its sig-
nature and its authentihash do not match. Invalid (malformed) signatures’ error
messages from the sigcheck tool is “the digital signature of the object did not verify
(0x80096010).” This invalid signature results from simply copying a digital signa-
ture and a code signing certificate from a binary sample to another one. In other
words, it is not related to a breach of trust in the publishers or the CAs side because
adversaries do not need to have or steal a private key in this case. However, these
malformed signatures account for 31.1% of the total signed malware in the data
set. We are curious why many malware with malformed signatures are found in
our dataset, and we conduct an experiment to determine if such digital signatures
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can help the malware with malformed signatures bypass clients’ protections of web
browsers, AV products, and operating systems.
Browser protections. Microsoft IE9 and Google Chrome include SmartScreen and
Safe Browsing respectively. It helps clients protect against malicious executable files
from the Internet. To measure these protections, we conduct an experiment where
we simply copy a legitimate certificate and signature to a benign, simple calculator
file. The calculator file does not require elevated privileges. The copying signatures
result in an executable file with a malformed signature. Then, we download the
file from the Web on Chrome and IE9, as both of these browsers provide protection
against malware (Google Safe Browsing and SmartScreen). Both Safe Browsing and
SmartScreen blocked the sample with a malformed signature. However, we find that
if the sample’s extension is removed (.exe), it bypasses the protections.
Operating system protections. Windows platforms show a warning message to
clients when the executable files come from the Web. However, if the file does not
come from the Web (for example, it is copied from a USB drive), executing the
file does not trigger any warning messages. We also tested another executable file
with a malformed signature that needs elevated privileges. This executable triggers a
warning message saying that the file comes from an unknown source when a privilege
is asked to elevate regardless of where the file comes. Note that this is the same
warning as the unsigned binary files. Windows can detect malformed signatures, but
it does not prevent clients from executing the binaries with malformed signatures.
No further warnings and checks are performed if a user ignores the warning. In short,
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Windows platforms provide minimal protection for clients against executables with
malformed signatures and web browsers defenses apply only to executable files from
the Web; the last defense, therefore, is AV engines.
Anti-virus protections. To understand how malformed signatures can affect the
AV engines, we conduct an experiment where we first download five random un-
signed ransomware samples recently reported to VirusTotal. These binaries are ob-
viously malware since they are classified as ransomware by 56-58 (more than 90%)
AV engines. We extract two already-expired code signing certificates and signatures
from two benign executable samples. These signatures and code signing certificates
are already misused for malformed signatures in the wild. We copy the two signa-
tures and two certificates to each ransomware sample; that is, in total there are ten
samples with the malformed signatures.
Surprisingly, we find that such naive attack helps malware avoid AVs detec-
tion. Table 5.3 presents the AVs and the number of samples they failed to detect.
The impact of this simple attack varies with the AV engines. The most affected
AVs are nProtect, Tencent, and Paloalto. In particular, the AVs detect unsigned
ransomware but classify eight of the ten crafted samples as benign. The malformed
signatures averagely reduce the VirusTotal detection rate of rmal by 20.7%. We
believe that this is because AVs take digital signatures into account when filtering
and prioritizing executable files to scan to reduce the overhead of inspecting the
binaries on users’ computers. Such the naive attack can help adversaries exploit the
malformed signatures to evade AV detection. We have reported this issue to the
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nProtect 8 F-Prot 4 Symantec 2 Sophos 2
Tencent 8 CrowdStrike 4 TrendMicro-HouseCall 2 SentinelOne 2
Paloalto 8 ClamAV 4 Avira 2 VBA32 2
AegisLab 7 VIPRE 4 Microsoft 2 Zillya 1
TheHacker 6 AVware 4 Fortinet 2 Qihoo-360 1
CAT-QuickHeal 6 Ikarus 4 ViRobot 2 Kaspersky 1
Comodo 6 Bkav 3 K7GW 2 ZoneAlarm 1
Rising 5 TrendMicro 3 K7AntiVirus 2
Cyren 4 Malwarebytes 2 NANO-Antivirus 2
Table 5.3: Bogus Digest Detection (AV and the number of detection
fail) [2].
affected AV companies. One of them confirms that they had the issue in their AV
product and plans to fix the issue. Another AV company gives another confirmation
but does not provide details about this issue.
5.3.2.4 Properly Signed Malware
189 malware samples in the data set are properly signed with 111 unique code
signing certificates. To sign them, adversaries must have private keys associated
with the certificates. we first investigate how these code signing certificates are
misused for malware in the wild and how long clients are exposed to these security
threats. Of 111 code signing certificates, 27 certificates have been revoked. All
executable files signed with these revoked certificates can be valid as long as they
are properly trusted-timestamped. We notify the CAs of the compromised code
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Figure 5.4: Number of unique certificates per family [2].
signing certificates and ask them for revocations except for two CAs (GlobalSign
and Go Daddy) cause of their abuse report systems have submission errors.
Malware families. We utilize AVClass [75] to label the malware family. We iden-
tify a total of 116 malware families in the 189 properly signed malware. The most
popular malware family is delf (seven samples), followed by fareit (four samples).
As illustrated in Figure 5.4, 103 malware families use a single code signing certificate
for each single malware, and 13 malware families use more than two code signing
certificates. Of the families with multiple certificates, we observe that the malware
families are droppers (delf, banload, agentb, dynamer, autoit), fake AVs (onescan,
smartfortress), and bots (Zeus). However, malware families signed with each single
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code signing certificate are used for the targeted attacks; e.g., Krbanker (targeted
customers of South Korean banks) and Shylock (targeted customers of UK banks.
Moreover, most of the signed malware (88.8%) rely on a single code signing cer-
tificate, which indicates that abusive code signing certificates are controlled and
misused by malware authors than by third parties.
Certificates. An abusive code signing certificate is averagely used to sign 1.5 mal-
ware families. Most code signing certificates (79.3%) were issued to software pub-
lishers in five countries (China, Korea, USA, Brazil, and the UK). We believe that
this observation reflects the software publishers’ reputation used for targeted vic-
tims. In particular, targeted attacks against victims (individuals or organizations)
are located in one of the countries.
TSA. Most signed malware (111, 66.8%) were trusted-timestamped; VeriSign was
preferred for TSA (38, 34.2%), which suggests that malware authors consider ex-
tending the validity of their signed malware beyond its expiration dates.
Certificate lifecycle. As mentioned in Section 2.3.3, trusted timestamping can
extends the validity of signed executable files even after its code signing certifi-
cate’ expiration date. To understand how long clients are exposed to these security
threats, we examine the abusive code signing certificates’ lifecycle. We take a look
at 1) the expiration date for each code signing certificate, 2) the revocation date in
the CRLs (if possible), and 3) the compromised date when benign and malicious
executable files are signed with the compromised certificates. If an executable file
has a trusted timestamp, we consider it as a signing date. Otherwise, the earliest
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date of either a first submission date in WINE or VT is considered as a signed date.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the lifecycle of abusive code signing certificates. For ex-
ample, Stuxnet [14] is one of sophisticated attacks. The compromised code signing
certificate misused for Stuxnet had been used to sign a lot of benign, legitimate exe-
cutable files. the code signing certificate is revoked and the effective revocation date
is set to the date when the malware is signed after the abuse is discovered. We tend
to believe that Stuxnet is the earliest abuse cases, but we observe that it happened
in 2003 for a code signing certificate from Skyline Software. Interestingly, we find
that five code signing certificates were misused to sign malware, not trusted times-
tamped, but they are found after its certificate expiration date. Adversaries have no
motivation, but an attempt to evade AV detection as discussed in Section 5.3.2.3.
We believe that the attack has been present in the wild for a relatively long time.
To understand how long the compromised code signing certificate remains a
security threat, we utilize the survival analysis [76], which can estimate the proba-
bility of the survival of the compromised code signing certificates (i.e., they are not
revoked). A signing date of the oldest malware sample signed with a certain code
signing certificate is considered as the birthday of the abuse. We estimate death
events (when the certificates are revoked). For a revoked certificate, we utilize the
scanning date of VirusTotal reports, and consider the most last date when the state
is “valid.” Then, we compute the time difference in days between the revocation
date and the timestamping date or the first appearance date of the oldest malware
signed by the same certificate. This is a conservative estimation of how long the
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Figure 5.5: Lifecycle of the abusive certificates [2]
tificate becomes compromised and the death date is a lower bound for when the
certificate revoked.
We calculate the Kaplan-Meier estimator [76] for the estimation of the survival
as presented in Figure 5.6. 96% compromised code signing certificate can survive
after the first date. The probability keeps to decrease continuously, but slowly for 5.6
years. Then it stops at 80%. This indicates that security threats are resilient. Only
20% code signing certificates misused to signed malware are likely to be revoked.
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Figure 5.6: Estimation of the threat effectiveness [2]
5.3.2.5 Measuring the Abuse Factors
We more deeply examine the properly signed malware to answer our research
question of “How and why code signing abuse happened,” using the abuse detection
algorithm from Section 5.3.1.3.
Publisher-side key mismanagement. A code signing certificate is considered
being resulted from this category if the benign and malicious executable files are
found in the same group of a certain certificate. Of the 111 groups, 75 certificates are
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Compromised Identify Theft Shell Company
Issuer Count Issuer Count Issuer Count
Thawte 27 Thawte 8 Wosign 2
VeriSign 24 Comodo 4 DigiCert 1
Comodo 8 VeriSign 4 USERTrust 1
USERTrust 2 eBiz Networks 3 GlobalSign 1
Certum 2 USERTrust 1
Others 9 Others 2
Total 72 (64.9%) Total 22 (19.8%) Total 5 (4.5%)
Table 5.4: Type of abuse and the top 5 frequent CAs [2]
used to signing both malicious and benign samples. Surprisingly, most (50, 66.7%)
certificates are still valid; in other words, they are not revoked yet. To categorize
the compromised code signing certificate, we manually investigate malware samples
signed with the certificates.
• Compromised certificate. Of 75 code signing certificates, we believe that
most (72) were compromised and misused for signing malware. In other words,
the private keys associated with the certificates are stolen and misused to sign
malware. In the data set, we find that Stuxnet malware [14] signed with the
Realtek Semiconductor Corp. certificate issued from VeriSign. Our system
also detects that an Australian department’s private key was also stolen and
misused to sign autoit malware.
• Infected developer machines. We also identify infected developer ma-
chines that affect all benign executable files built on the developer machines. It
automatically includes malicious payloads into benign samples and signs them
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with a legitimate code signing certificate, which results in signed malicious exe-
cutables distributed with a legitimate package. We find that three code singing
certificates misused to sign W32/Induc.A malware that infects only Delphi de-
veloper machines. We also investigate the prevalence of W32/Induc.A malware
in the wild. Approximately 1,554 executable files are detected as W32/Induc.A
and 93,016 machines were infected. Among these machines, the only 180 were
Delphi compiler machines used for developers. This indicates that infecting
developer machines is a very efficient way to amplify the impact of signed
malware and infect 517× more machines.
Table 5.4 depicts that 70% of the code signing certificates in this category are
issued by Symantec group (VeriSign and Thawte).
CA-side verification failure. The weakness in this category results from CAs’
failure in their vetting process when issuing code signing certificates. For example,
a CA may issue a code signing certificate to a malware author who uses fake in-
formation by 1) impersonating others 2) establishing shell companies. We believe
that 27 code signing certificates are is-issued to adversaries because of verification
failures. We also manually investigate each code signing certificate by searching the
company name on the Internet or in openCorporates to check if the companies are
legitimate and to distinguish between shell companies or identity theft. 22 code
signing certificates (out of 27 certificates) are mis-issued through identify theft, and
5 are done through shell company.
To understand the weakness in this category, we also investigate the vetting
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process before issuing code signing certificates. At the end of 2016, Certificate
Authority Security Council (CASC) announced a minimum requirement for code
signing certificates [38]. Microsoft announced the CAs must follow the minimum
requirements after February 1, 2017. The new requirements include:
• Stronger protection of private keys. Private keys must be stored on se-
cure cryptographic hardware—e.g., a USB token or Hardware security module
(HSM).
• Careful identity verification. Strictly verification for the identity of the
publisher is required, which also includes the cross-checking with the blacklist
for bad publishers.
• Better response to the abuse. Quick responses to the revocation requests
are required within two days.
• TSA is now a requirement. Every CAs must operate an RFC-3161
compliant TSA.
Verification and further investigation. We contact the owners of the compro-
mised code signing certificate found in this work, 1) to inform them that their code
signing certificates are compromised and abused, and 2) to better understand the
code signing ecosystem. We manually look for their information on the Internet and
send emails to 23 publishers to ask them if they have owned the code signing certifi-
cates and are aware of this issue. We are not able to send emails to more publishers
since their information is not searchable on the Internet. We receive eight emails
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from them. All of them said that they had the code signing certificates and used
to sign only their benign programs. Three of them already recognized that their
code signing certificates were abused and revoked because they were notified that
their code signing certificates were compromised. A publisher said that their private
key might be stolen because they shared with other people the machine where their
private key was stored.
5.4 Code Signing Certificates Traded in Black Markets
The first goal of malware authors is to conceal their identities on their signed
malware samples. However, it is very difficult for them to legitimately obtain code
signing certificates from CAs. This is because the current CAs’ vetting processes
prevent them from obtaining code signing certificates to sign their malware unless
they provide their identities to the CAs. Therefore, as discussed in the previous
Section 5.3, the malware authors establish shell companies or steal others’ identities
to sign their malware, which raises research questions “how do malware authors
legitimately acquire code signing certificates?” and “is there another channel where
malware authors readily obtain code signing certificates?”
Recent anecdotal reports indicate that on underground markets code signing
certificates are also traded [77–79]. These underground markets allow malware au-
thors to readily purchase a new code signing certificate with a new publisher identity
to use it for signing their malware. However, these anecdotal reports regarding the
underground economy are not well understood. In particular, the economic driving
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for code signing certificates trades in underground markets has not been analyzed
yet.
In this work7, we measure and analyze the underground trade for code sign-
ing certificates with the whole ecosystems of vendors, malware authors, certificates
issuers.
5.4.1 Data Collection
To answer the research questions, we first crawl the black market for code
signing certificates and passively collect black market data8. We analyze black mar-
ket vendors and their business models and observe their activities in underground
markets. However, there are challenges in data collection about black markets for
code signing certificates. Particularly, there is no easy way to locate the black
markets where code signing certificates are traded. The prior report described an
online black market for code signing certificates [77], but the online marketplace
is no longer active as of this work. Moreover, Christin collected SilkRoad, black
market in darkweb and released the data sets [80]. However, our interest in code
signing certificates is not found in the released data set; rather SilkRoad is a general
marketplace such as narcotics.
To overcome this challenge, we begin with a handful number of well-known
websites (such as hacking forums and marketplaces). We utilize these websites to
7Published as [3]
8We do not interact with any black market vendors such purchasing code signing certificates or
exchange messages.
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expand the data sets for black markets. First we start an investigation on the black
market vendors who sell code signing certificates. Then, we analyze information
posted on the websites over time: for example, how big the business is, how much
profit they make, etc. These works are manually conducted because of 1) a large
variety of goods and 2) anti-crawling protections which prevent me from automatic
crawling the websites.
Forums and Marketplaces. We start with a small number of well-known hacking
forums (e.g., Hackforums), general marketplaces on darkweb (e.g., Dream Market),
and link directory sites for darkweb (e.g., Torlinks). Then, we search some keywords
related to code signing certificates (such as “code signing,” “certificates,” etc.) on
these websites. We keep expanding the data collection until new closed websites are
found that we cannot access.
In total, we found 28 forums, 6 link directory websites for darkweb, and 4
general marketplaces. Of these 4 marketplaces, only one website sells only code
signing certificates, called CodeSigning Guru.
Vendors and Purchases. We find in total four vendors who sell code signing
certificates in multiple forums (with the same user ID or advertisement), and one
e-shop, called CodeSigning Guru, launched and operated by one of the four vendors.
We first collect information regarding the vendor activities such as registration date,
last edit date, post date, etc.). In particular, our focus is on stock updates and
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Vendor
Activity & Presence Inferred Sales Volume Products
First Joined Last Reply Forums Vouches Updates E-Shop Item: pieces Price ($)










C 2016-09-09 2017-01-27 10 0 - -
EV (earlier posts) 1600
EV (current) 3000




w/ SmartScreeen rep.: 1 800
w/ SmartScreeen rep.: 5 3700
w/ SmartScreeen rep.: 10 7000
Table 5.5: The leading black market vendors [3]
vouches. This information of the remaining stock was posted by the vendor. The
payments for CodeSigning Guru e-shop are made through Selly9. Selly is a web
platform where vendors can sell their items by hiding their identities and clients can
buy the items vice versa. The payment will be made typically using cryptocurrency
such as Bitcoin. Therefore, we implement a crawler that collects the remaining stock
every five minutes from Aug. 25th, 2017 and Dec. 7th, 2017. This remaining stock
information helps to understand the size of the black market business.
5.4.2 Code Signing Certificate Black Market
Black markets are dominated by four vendors (A-D). we manually investigate
these four vendors and Table 5.5 summarizes the vendor business activities such




5.4.2.1 Vendors and Activity
Vendor D operates on two English speaking forums, and vendors A and C
do on 10 and 3 Russian speaking forums respectively, but vendor B operates on
both three Russian and five English speaking forums. Moreover, vendor B extends
her/his business by starting up a new e-shop for code signing certificates, called
CodeSigning Guru in August 2017. Good and prices are the same as the posts that
they made on hacking forums. The vendor also advertises the e-shop on the forums
for potential customers.
The oldest vendor A is not very active now, but he/she had posted his/her
selling code signing certificates from 2015 with no more updates. However, vendor
B, C, and D more than half of their posts are made after May 2017. The two most
active vendors B and D regularly update their posts around once or twice a month
and reply to any questions to the original posts such as remaining stocks.
They typically start a new thread on a forum and update the thread over time
with price changes, new features, etc. All transactions are made in private; typically
over instances messaging services such as telegrams or jabber. Therefore, it is very
difficult to know the estimation of sales. They keep using the same user IDs for
their reputation, and the same content of the posts.
The previous report [77] presented Signature-as-a-Service (SaaS) in the past.
However, in our measurement, we are unable to find any evidence of the SaaS
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business model. Rather they sell code signing certificates and malware authors
purchase the certificates to sign their malware themselves.
5.4.2.2 Goods and Deals
Vendors A and D sell standard code signing certificates, but vendor C offers
only EV code signing certificates. Vendor B who operates CodeSigning Guru pro-
vides both standard and EV code signing certificates. All of them claim that their
certificates are very fresh; in other words, they are directly issued from CAs. Some
vendors ask customers (malware authors) to pay the half of the price since code
signing certificates are issued from CAs on demand. Vendor A, interestingly claims
that he/she always has a few of publisher identities to apply for a new code signing
certificate; in turn, customers (malware authors) can choose one of the publisher
identities.
Vendors also explain what the code signing is for beginners. Particularly,
they explicitly explain that standard code signing certificates can be considered as
non-benign ones. This is because code signing certificates have to build their own
reputation. Vendors provide details about how to bypass SmartScreen by building
reputations for code signing certificates. Interestingly, vendor D offers code signing
certificates with an already-built reputation. Vendor B mentions on the FAQ of
his/her e-shop website, to build a reputation, around 2,000 – 3,000 installations
of benign files are required on Windows 10 systems, which helps avoid warning
messages when the signed files are executed on Windows platforms.
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Certificates
Total Average per month
Items sold Revenue ($) Items sold Revenue ($)
Comodo 29 10,150 8.36 2,928
Thawte 12 6,000 3.46 1,731
Total 41 16,150 11.83 4,659
Table 5.6: Sales volume recorded on Codesigning Guru [3]
Prices for standard code signing certificates range between $350 to $500. Ven-
dor D sells code signing certificates issued from Comodo, Thawte, DigiCert, and
Symantec in $400. However, Vendor B sells code signing certificates at different
prices; for example, a certificate from Comodo costs at $350, a Thawte one does
at $500. He/she claims that a Thawte code signing certificate has more trustful.
EV certificates that do not require reputation building are more expensive. In the
earliest post, vendor C sells an EV certificate at $1,600, and the most recent posts,
the same vendor does an EV certificate at $3,000, which means the price increases.
Meanwhile, vendor B sells an EV certificate at $2,500 both from the forums and the
e-shop website. The EV certificate requires a USB token for storing the associated
private key. The USB will be sent to customers by vendors.
5.4.2.3 Sales Volume
All transactions on forums are hard to know or estimate since they made in
private. As shown in Table 5.5, we report the number of vouches for each vendor.
Vouches are the way to establish trust in the black market by leaving comments
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or reviews of purchased code signing certificates. However, not all customers write
comments or reviews so that these vouches cannot be feasible to estimate the sales
volume.
The most active vendor B regularly updates their remaining stock on their e-
shop website. The stock updates can be used to estimate the vendor B’s sales volume
and their profits. The e-shop sells standard code signing certificates from Comodo or
Thawte, and EV certificates from unspecified a CA. During the observation period
(Aug. 25th, 2017 – Dec. 7th, 2017), we observe that 41 standard certificates are
sold. On average, 11.8 code signing certificates are sold per month, which brings in
a total of $16,150 revenue (refer to Table 5.6).
5.5 Revocation Effectiveness in Code Signing PKI
Code signing certificates can be compromised due to several reasons as dis-
cussed in Section 5.3, or they are mis-issued directly to malware authors or black
market vendors as presented in Section 5.4. In Section 5.3, we find that malware
authors stole the private keys of legitimate code signing certificates that have been
used to sign benign executable files. Then, the stolen private keys are misused to
sign their malicious executable files. As discussed in Section 5.4, malware authors
or black market vendors obtain standard and EV code signing certificates legiti-
mately from CAs. They also misuse the mis-issued code signing certificate for their
malicious executable files.
The primary defense against the abuse is revocation. In other words, the
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compromised or misused code signing certificates must be revoked by the issuing
CAs. In the Web PKI, prior works have revealed significant problems including
long revocation delays [27,43,44], heavy bandwidth costs for dissemination [46], and
clients misbehavior (e.g., web browsers do not properly check revocation status) [46].
By contrast, little is known about the revocation of the Code-Signing PKI. The
scarce understanding can mislead platform security protections to having incorrect
assumptions when handling code signing certificates.
Moreover, the validity of code signing certificates can be extended as long as
a binary sample is trusted timestamped. If a binary sample is properly signed and
trusted timestamped, the binary sample can be valid after its certificate expiration
date, which remains security threats if it is malware. Therefore, the code signing
certificates should be revoked even after expired. This is a critical issue in the code
signing PKI.
In this work10, we measure and analyze the effectiveness of revocation in the
code signing PKI. First, we identify the effective revocation process; 1) promptly
discover misused code signing certificates, 2) properly revoke the certificates, and 3)
properly disseminate the revocation information to clients. Moreover, we find out
what security threats can be introduced if the revocation process is not effective.
Unlike the prior studies in the Web PKI [41,44–46,81] where TLS certificates
can be collected by scanning the Internet, we are not able to utilize a comprehen-
sive corpus of code signing certificates because there is no official repository for code
signing certificates. To overcome the challenge, we use data sets that are publicly
10Published as [4].
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released from prior research [12, 13] and use Symantec’s internal repository of bi-
nary samples to increase our coverage. We extract 145,582 distinct leaf code signing
certificates from the dataset. From the code signing certificates, we also extract 215
distinct Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) used only for code signing certificates,
and distinct 131 Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) points. We periodically
probe the collected CRLs to check their revocation status to collect the revocation
publication date when a certificate is revoked by a CA and the revocation informa-
tion is disseminated.
In short, we make the following contributions:
1. We collected a large corpus of code signing certificates as well as revocation
information of the certificates.
2. We conducted end-to-end measurement of the revocation process in the code
signing PKI.
3. We estimated a lower bound on the number of compromised certificates.
4. We highlighted the security problems in the three steps in the revocation
process.
5.5.1 Discovery of Potentially Compromised Certificates
Due to many reasons, code signing certificates must be revoked. Generally, it is
hard to determine code signing certificates should be revoked or when they should
be revoked. However, in one situation we can be certain that prompt certificate
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revocation is necessary; when the corresponding private keys have been compromised
or are in the hands of malicious actors to use to sign their malware [38].
Therefore, we estimate a conservative number of compromised code signing cer-
tificate used to sign malware in the wild. Moreover, we compare the estimated num-
ber with the coverage of a major security company to better understand how diffi-
cult to discover all potentially compromised certificates in the wild (Section 5.5.1.1).
Furthermore, CAs must take action of revoking the compromised certificates after
signed malware has been discovered, and they add the revoked certificates’ serial
numbers to CRLs. We measure the time delays between 1) the date when signed
malware appears in the wild and 2) the date when the revoked certificates are added
to CRLs (Section 5.5.1.2).
5.5.1.1 Mark-recapture Population Estimation
The revocation process begins by discovering the compromised certificates mis-
used to sign malware. To measure how effectively CAs discover malware samples
signed with their code signing certificates, we employ the mark-recapture analy-
sis [82] because there is no official repository for code signing certificates and signed
executable files.
The mark-recapture analysis is to estimate the size of N of a wildlife population
not observed in the entirety. Two separate samples are required. 1) The first
samples should be the random capture of n1 subjects; then the samples are marked
and released in the wild. 2) The second samples are the random capture of n2
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subjects among p are the markings from the first sampling. In other words, p is the
intersection of the first and second samples. An estimated N̂ for the total population





For this study, N becomes the total number of code signing certificates misused
for signed malware. To apply this technique to this study, we utilize two different
data sets: VirusTotal and Symantec telemetry. We consider each data set is sam-
ples of potentially compromised code signing certificates. In particular, n1 and n2
represent the numbers of certificates to be revoked since they are misused to sign
malware from VirusTotal and Symantec data sets respectively.
Assumptions and interpretation. The Mark-recapture technique requires three
assumptions regarding the population and the sampling process, but the sampling
process does not fit this study. First, the subjects of the population must be captured
with an equal chance, which means the population is homogeneous. However, the
population of code signing certificates is unlikely homogeneous. For instance, a
popular software company’s code signing certificate may more likely appear in these
two data sets. Second, the samples have to be independent; in other words, the first
sampling (capturing) should not affect the second recapturing.
To mitigate the first issue (homogeneousness), we first compute the daily es-
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timates between Apr. 18, 2017 and Sept. 10, 2017. Some certificates issued before
Apr. 2017 can be included in the two data sets. However, we believe that malware
signed with the older code signing certificates may not have a high chance of ap-
pearing in the VirusTotal Hunting. Moreover, some other code signing certificates
are misused for only targeted attacks; accordingly, the code signing certificates may
nor appear in either the two data sets.
To minimize the second issue (Independence), we also estimate N̂ separately
for each day and consider the birth date for each code signing certificate as the
first seems to timestamp in Symantec telemetry and VirusTotal. Furthermore, we
consider the revocation date (tp)as the death date of a code signing certificate;
in other words, the revoked code signing certificate leaves the population. The
population is closed within each day because CRLs are collected and updated every
day.
Note that these approaches for the estimated population (N̂) would underesti-
mate the real entire population of potentially compromised code signing certificates
(N). Similarly, the intersections (p) between the two data sets will increase when
the dependencies are large, which leads to an underestimation of N . In short, this
estimation in this work must be interpreted as a lower bound for the real total pop-
ulation of potentially compromised certificates.
Results. Taking into account the considerations listed above, we estimate a lower























































































































Figure 5.7: Mark-recapture estimation [4].
estimation is done per day starting from the birth of the oldest certificate in the
dataset.
Figure 5.7 shows two graphs: a) trend in malware signing certificates (mark-
recapture estimation as red and observed number as blue) over time and b) com-
parison between the estimation and the total number of newly revoked certificates
during (4/18/17− 9/10/17) (the label starts from 4/17 since it is the start of that
week. Particularly, a) shows the average of the daily estimations N̂ for each week
during our observation period. We also compare the estimation with the actual
number of the potentially compromised certificate that is the union of the two data
sets of Symantec and VirusTotal.
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We exclude the last week (9/4 – 9/10) because the estimation and the observa-
tion are identical due to the fact that eventually most of the certificates got revoked
for the ones from the Symantec telemetry. We estimate that at least 1,004 – 1,786
code signing certificates were misused for malware in the wild. The misused certifi-
cates are not revoked by the date of the estimation. The estimated population is
averagely 2.74× bigger than the actual observed number of certificates. It indicates
that even the biggest malware collector, VirusTotal and a major security company,
Symantec are unable to capture all real population of the potentially compromised
certificates.
5.5.1.2 Revocation Delay
According to the minimum requirement [38], CAs must revoke a code signing
certificate within seven days after they discover the certificate becomes compromised
and misused for malware. As described in Section 5.3, the compromised code signing
certificates are estimated to remain valid for more than 5.6 years after they are first
misused to sign malware. However, it is estimation so that in this section, we mea-
sure how promptly CAs revoke their compromised certificates using a data-driven
approach. This measurement requires an accurate estimate of a revocation publica-
tion date (tp). Therefore, we develop a crawler that collects revocation publication
dates between Apr. 16th, 2017 and Sept. 10th, 2017.
Another challenge we have is to know when signed malware appears in the
wild and they are discovered by CAs. We use Symantec metadata telemetry (see
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Section 5.2.3) to know executable files signed with revoked code signing certificates.
Of 2,617 revoked code signing certificates, 468 (17.9%) are found in our dataset,
and 146,286 executable files signed with the revoked certificates. Because Symantec
does not collect these actual executable files, we utilize VirusTotal and AVClass [75]
to obtain reports of these executable files. We also use the first submission date of
each executable files from VirusTotal reports. In total, 19,053 unique samples in
VirusTotal are found, and 254 unique certificates are used to sign the samples.
For each code signing certificate, we use the earliest first submission date of
VirusTotal as the discovery date (td) because we believe that AV companies and CAs
should monitor VirusTotal and check if their code signing certificates are misused to
sign malware. We compute the revocation delay (tp − td) as the difference between
the earliest scanning date of malware in each group (td) and the date when revoked
and disseminated (revocation publication date (tp)).
Results. Figure 5.8 shows a cumulative distribution of the revocation delay between
the dates on which the malware signed with compromised certificates and the dates
on which CAs revoke the compromised certificate. The revocation delay is between
one day and 1,553 days. The average delay is 171.4 days (5.6 months) (std 324.9
days, median 38 days) to revoke their certificates after the malware signed with the
compromised certificates appear in the wild. The delay indicates that CAs do not
always strictly follow the requirements yet, or there is not enough coordination to
get early alerts on newly discovered signed malware. Consequently, Windows clients
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Figure 5.8: Revocation delays. The delay is between the date when the malware
is signed with an abusive code signing certificate and the date when the issuing CA
revoke the compromised certificate. [4]
malware appears in the wild.
5.5.2 Setting the Revocation Date
To make all signed malicious executable files invalid, CAs must determine a
proper revocation date, called effective revocation date after potentially compro-
mised code signing certificates are discovered. In this section, we measure how
properly CAs set effective revocation dates.
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5.5.2.1 Problems in Revocation Date Setting
As described in Section 2.3.4, CAs must set a proper effective revocation date
when revoking compromised code signing certificates. There are the two ways of
setting effective revocation dates; 1) hard revocation and 2) soft revocation. In hard
revocation, CAs set tr (effective revocation date) to ti (issue date), which leads to
software publishers re-signing and re-distributing their software. On the contrast,
when tr is set between ti (issue date) and te (expiration date), it is called soft
revocation. In soft revocation, if an effective revocation date is properly determined
and set, it would be a perfect solution. This is because software publishers do
not need to re-sign and re-distribute their software while all malicious executable
files signed with the compromised certificates become invalid. We examine what
revocation date setting policies CAs apply and how the policy trends have been
changed over time. We also identify security threats caused by the erroneous effective
revocation date setting in soft revocation.
Trend of effective revocation date setting. We measure what revocation date
setting policy CAs to apply when revoking compromised certificates using the col-
lected 145,582 code signing certificates (Section 5.2.3). We first utilize CRLs for
revocation status specified at its x509 v3 code signing certificate extension field.
Table 5.7 breaks down the effective revocation date setting policy. We find that
5,410 (3.7% out of 145,582) code signing certificates have been explicitly revoked.
Of those, 96% (5,196) code signing certificates were issued by the top 10 CAs. Most
(1,880, 34.8%) revoked code signing certificates were issued by Comodo, followed by
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< ti = ti ≤ te > te Total
Comodo 0 426 1,437 17 1,880
Thawte 0 74 1,055 39 1,168
Go Daddy 2 14 672 18 706
Verisign 2 59 430 51 542
Digicert 1 161 323 3 488
Starfield 0 3 153 2 158
Symantec 0 33 89 1 123
Wosign 0 57 17 0 74
Startcom 0 0 47 0 47
Certum 0 1 9 0 10
Other 0 96 117 1 214
Total 5 924 4,349 132 5,410
Table 5.7: Effective revocation date setting policy for top 10 CAs. (ti: issue
date and te: expiration date) [4]
Thawte (1,168, 21.6%). Most (4,481, 82.8%) code signing certificates were revoked
using the soft revocation policy while only 17.2% code signing certificates apply the
hard revocation policy.
Most CAs perform both soft revocation and hard revocation. Soft revocation
is more preferred than hard revocation in all CAs except for WoSign. Particularly,
Startcom has never applied hard revocation for their revoked code signing certifi-
cates. Interestingly, three CAs (Go Daddy, Verisign, and Digicert) set the effective
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Figure 5.9: Effective revocation date setting trends. Number of revoked cer-
tificates (stacked). [4]
This can be considered hard revocation; thus there are no security threats for clients.
Figure 5.9 shows the total number of hard and soft revocations; the total number
has drastically increased since 2012. It is worth noting that the revocation numbers
for 2016 and 2017 have not finally made yet. Therefore, we believe that the numbers
will continue to increase in the future due to the revocation delays.
Ineffective revocation date setting. As described in Section 2.3.4, soft revoca-
tion can lead to signed malware remain valid even after the code signing certificate
was revoked if the CA erroneously set effective revocation dates. As presented in
Table 5.7, most CAs have experienced setting the effective revocation dates to even
after its code signing certificate expiration dates. This means that the revoked code
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signing certificates become ineffective so that all executable files (including malware)
signed with the code signing certificates still remain valid.
We conduct a measurement study of how many CAs make mistakes by setting
effective revocation dates, and accordingly, how many signed malware can be still
valid due to the errors. To examine the wrong effective revocation dates, the signing
date information of signed executable files is required. We utilize the WINE data
set (see Section 5.2.1) and query VirusTotal with 12,351,946 signed executable files
from the WINE data set. Of these, 38.3% (4,729,023) samples signed with 45,613
leaf unique certificates are found in VirusTotal. We are unable to directly query
VirusTotal for all old samples and to obtain the effective revocation dates of the
45,613 code signing certificates because 1) the search index service of VirusTotal
supports for only recent 80TB data or approximately one month of samples, and
2) VirusTotal does not provide any information related to revocation such as CRLs
and OCSP points. Thus, we query the CRLs we have collected from Section 5.2.3
to check if a code signing certificate is revoked and to obtain an effective revocation
date (tr). This process returns 1,022 revoked certificates (out of 45,613).
Ineffective revocation date setting. We observe that CAs who applied the soft
revocation policy erroneously set the effective revocation date (tr) of 45 (5.1% out
of 891) TLS certificates. We also measure how many signed malware is still valid
due to the erroneous effective revocation date. We first utilize AVClass [75] to label
signed malware using VirusTotal reports. Among signed malware samples, if signed
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Figure 5.10: CDF of the revocation date setting error (tr − tm). [4]
the effective revocation date. We observe that 250 signed malware (5.3% out of
4,716 signed malware) still remain valid due to the wrong effective revocation dates,
which means the validity of signed malware can result in security threats to clients.
Figure 5.10 presents the difference between the oldest signing dates of the signed
malware (tm) and the effective revocation dates (tr). The longest difference is 1,019
days (2.8 years) and the shortest one is one day. Windows clients may be exposed to
the security threats where they may execute or install the still-valid signed malware
because the signed malware is still valid although the corresponding code signing
certificate is already revoked.
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5.5.3 Dissemination of Revocation Information
The next step for CAs is to disseminate revocation status information to clients
after compromised and mis-issued certificates are properly revoked and effective re-
vocation date are correctly decided. We first look at the enforcement of the Windows
platforms because the enforcement policies of checking revocation status information
in client-side platforms can affect clients in terms of security.
5.5.3.1 Enforcement in Windows
Windows platforms must check the validity of code signing certificates upon
encountered signed executable files. Depending on the Windows’ policy that handles
the failures in checking revocation status, Windows’ clients will be affected when
executing binary files.
The soft-fail policy is applied on the Windows’ platform, which means the
platforms presumably believe code signing certificates are valid even though the
revocation status information is not available. Consequently, when the network or
CAs’ infrastructures have issues, clients are able to execute a signed binary with
revoked certificates without any warnings. We find that the problems in the CAs’
dissemination of revocation status information, with the soft-fail policy of the Win-
dows platforms, can allow executable files signed with revoked certificates to be
executed without security warning messages.
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5.5.3.2 Unavailable Revocation Information
CAs must maintain their certificates’ revocation status information for clients.
More importantly, the revocation status information must be kept and disseminated
indefinitely because of the trusted timestamps that extend the validity of signed exe-
cutable files beyond the certificates’ expiration dates. In other words, the revocation
status information should be maintained and always-available longer than the cer-
tificates’ life [39]. This is the most significant difference from the Web’s PKI (TLS).
Certificates without CRL URLs and OCSP points. The first problem we
find is that code signing certificates used to sign executable files do not include CRL
URLs and OCSP points. Code signing certificates follow the x.509 v3 standard
format, which means that the certificates must include CRL URLs and OCSP points
for clients. In turn, clients are able to check the revocation status of code signing
certificates using CRLs or OCSP.
However, we observe that 788 (0.5% out of 145,582 in Section 5.2.3) certificates
do contain neither CRLs and OCSP points. This means that clients are unable to
check the revocation status of these code signing certificates. Of the 788 code signing
certificates, most (676, 85.8%) were issued before 2003 by Thawte. The most recently
issued code signing certificate found in the 788 certificates it that iTrusChina’s one.
Therefore, we can conclude that the security problem exists and persists.
These 788 code signing certificates have already expired; thus, no new exe-
cutable files are unable to be signed with these code signing certificates. However,
previous executable files (including malware) signed with these 788 code signing
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Figure 5.11: Screenshot of Windows 10.
certificates can be valid if they are trusted-timestamped. In other words, clients
have exposed this security threat even though code signing certificates already had
been revoked.
We also examine how this security threat affects Windows platforms. We
obtain the executable binary samples signed with one of these 788 code signing
certificates from VirusTotal. We then inspect the code signing certificate of these
samples on Windows 7 and 10. We observe that on both the platforms, a message
of “The revocation function was unable to check revocation for the certificate” is
displayed and the code signing certificate is valid since the Windows platforms apply
the soft-fail policy as shown in Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12.
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Figure 5.12: Screenshot of the prompt displayed in Windows 10.
Unreachable CRLs and OCSP servers. We examine the reachability of CRLs
and OCSP servers specified in code signing certificates in our date set Section 5.2.3.
In our observation period (Apr.16th, 2017 – Sept. 10th, 2017), We find that 55
CRLs (out of 413) are not reachable at least once a day. However, our institution
had network issues that may have resulted in network failures in our reachability
checking system. Therefore, we manually double-check if the 55 CRLs were typically
reachable, and remove them, which remains 13 CRLs. The 13 CRLs have been never
reachable during the observation period. Of the 13 CRLs, 5 (38.4%) had HTTP 404
Not Found errors; for instance, two CRLs1112 had the 404 not found errors. This




longer update the CRL files, but the domains still exist and are being used.
Interestingly, a domain for CRLs has been obtained by a domain re-seller,
and the domain is being sold now. Using Internet Archive (https://archive.org/) to
check the history of the domain, the last time the old website was captured was in
August of 2015, and the domain re-seller page appeared in September of 2015. We
believe that the domain was taken between August 1st, 2015 and September 28th,
2015 because the legitimate website was last seen on Aug. 1st, 2015 and the domain
re-seller’s webpage was seen on Sept. 28th, 2015. We do not provide the detailed
information of the CRLs domain since an adversary is able to purchase the domain
from the domain re-seller and he/she can maliciously use the domain. For example,
he/she is able to either revoke all code signing certificates issued by the CA or
remove revoked serial numbers of compromised certificates from CLRs used to sign
malicious executable files. The lesson from this case is that the root/intermediate
CAs must take care of CRLs or OCSP server if leaf CAs are no longer maintained
or operated.
Another example is AOL. AOL (https://www.aol.com/) used to issue sign-
ing certificates in the early 2000s and operated their own CRL. After terminating
their certificate services, the CRLs (found under http://crl.aol.com) are no longer
maintained and the site cannot even be reached (different than the 404 error men-
tioned before). Program code including malware signed with the certificates can be
valid if they are trusted-timestamped since there is no way for clients to check the
certificates revocation status.
We also measure the reachabilities of OCSP severs (see Section 5.2.3). In total,
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15 OCSP points are unreachable by eight CAs (AOL, Verisign, Comodo, StartSSL,
WoSign, GlobalTrustFinder, Certum, and GlobalSign) after removing OCSP points
affected by our institution’s network issues as the same as the CRLs measurements.
Forbidden, timeout, bad hostname, and method not allowed are the main rea-
sons for the unreachability. In particular, AOL was a CA that issued code signing
certificates and maintained two OCSP servers. However, AOL is no longer a CA
and maintain the two OCSP servers, which leads to clients remain unable to ver-
ify AOL’s code signing certificates. The unreachability of CRLs and OCSP points
are very common due to various reasons as discussed above. The Windows plat-
forms should properly handle these failures; but because the Windows platforms
apply the soft-fail policy, executable files including malware signed with these code
signing certificates can remain valid.
5.5.3.3 Mismanagement in CRLs and OCSPs
In this section, we highlight several mismanagement issues in the CAs side for
the dissemination of revocation status information for clients.
No longer updated CRLs. According to the minimum requirements [38] for
code signing CAs, CRLs should be updated and re-issued at least once a week;
furthermore, the next update timestamp in the nextUpdate field also cannot be
more than ten days from the thisUpdate field.
We examine how frequently CAs update and re-issue their CRLs. 57 CRLs
(out of 215 CRLs) have been never updated. Most (34 of 57, 59.6%) CRLs are
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issued and maintained by Shanghai Electronic CA; but major code signing CAs’
CRLs are included in the 57 CRLs. Furthermore, most CRLs (130, 89.7% out of
145 CRLs, except for unreachable or not-updated CRLs) are updated and re-issued
every day, which indicates that CAs update and re-issue their CRLs when code
signing certificate is revoked and added to their CRLs.
Transient certificates in CRLs. Note that one of the distinct differences from
TLS is that CAs must take care of even expired certificates due to the trusted times-
tamping. However, we find that 278 revoked code signing certificates are removed
from 18 CRLs. The issuing CAs include GlobalSign, Comodo , Digicert, Entrust,
and Certum. Most removed serial numbers are never re-added, but interestingly,
one serial number from Digicert is re-added to the CRLs after 106 days.
We report this issue to all affected CAs to better understand why it happens
for CAs. A CA replied back that they had a flaw in their revocation process and
system that had removed expired certificates. They fixed the flaw to keep all revoked
code signing certificates in the CRLs indefinitely.
Inconsistent responses from CRLs and OCSP. Most recently issued code sign-
ing certificates include CRLs and OCSP points so that clients are able to use the two
mechanisms to check revocation status. Therefore, either CRLs or OCSP becomes
a fallback mechanism for another one. We presumably believe that the revocation
status in CRLs and OCSP should be consistent. In other words, if a revoked se-
rial number is found in CRLs, accordingly the corresponding response from OCSP
should indicate “revoked.”
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We observe that the revocation status responses of the 19 code signing cer-
tificates in the data set (Section 5.2.3) are inconsistent. More specifically, the code
signing certificates are valid from the OCSP, but they are found in the CRLs. Of
the 19 certificates, 16 and three certificate were issued by Go Daddy and Starfield
Technologies). Because Starfield was acquired by Go Daddy, we believe that these
two CAs may use the same infrastructures for revocation status information includ-
ing CRLs and OCSP, which results in the inconsistency problems. It indicates that
CAs must properly maintain CRLs and OCSP for consistency responses.
In Windows, OCSP is preferred over CRLs for checking revocation status.
Moreover, Windows does not double-check the status using CRLs if a certificate is
believed to be valid through OCSP. Therefore, inconsistent responses from OCSP
and CRLs can lead to serious security problems; especially only when the responses
from OCSP indicate the certificates are valid but revoked in CRLs. In this case,
Windows presumably believes that binary samples signed the revoked certificates to
be valid, and allows its users to execute the binary samples.
Unknown or unauthorized responses from OCSP. According to the OCSP
RFC specification [28], the OCSP servers must response three statuses for a re-
quested certificates; good, revoked, and unknown. Good means that the requested
certificate is valid, revoked means that the certificate is revoked. Finally, unknown is
that the requested OCSP server is unaware of the status of the requested certificate.
We examine how many OCSP servers responses the unknown status for re-
quested code signing certificates. Three OCSP responders (Certum, LuxTrust, and
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Shanghai Electronic CA) return that they are unaware of the 669 requested cer-
tificates issued by the corresponding CAs. Almost all of the affected code signing
certificates (658, 98%) are issued by Certum.
OCSP servers can response with an error message due to five reasons; mal-
formedRequest, internalError, tryLater, sigRequired, and unauthorized. In particu-
lar, the unauthorized indicates that either 1) the client is not authorized to query
the OCSP server, or 2) the OCSP server cannot respond authoritatively [28]. In
the OCSP responder side, they can response an unauthorized error either when 1)
they are unauthorized to access the revocation status records for requested the
certificates, or when 2) when the revocation status information is removed. We ex-
amine how many OCSP servers response with the unauthorized error messages for
their issued code signing certificates. In our date set (see Section 5.2.3), we find that
2,129 code signing certificates (1.5% out of 145,582) have the unauthorized errors.
Most of the code signing certificates (1,515, 71.2%) are issued by Go Daddy.
The Windows clients may not be affected by these unauthorized errors and un-
known responses because the Windows platforms check CRLs when these messages
are returned. However, it indicates that CAs improperly maintain their infrastruc-
tures for OCSP responders.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) enable entities to securely communicate
or exchange their digital assets such as binaries. In the PKIs, two representative
applications (the Web PKI and the Code-Signing PKI) are widely used. Specifically,
in the Web PKI, entities (i.e., clients) are able to authenticate web servers and to
securely communicate with the web servers because all messages between two entities
are encrypted. In the Code-Signing PKI, software developers who want to publish
their binaries in the wild sign the binaries with their private keys. In turn, clients are
able to establish trust in who publish the signed binaries and the signed binaries are
never altered, which means that the PKI guarantees the authenticity and integrity
of binaries.
However, adversaries exploit the weaknesses in the PKIs or users’ misunder-
standing of the PKIs for their malicious purpose such as political or economic gains.
Specifically, in the Web PKI, many modern web browsers display a green padlock
icon in its URL bar when users access the websites served with valid TLS certificates,
which mislead users to incorrectly understanding the meaning of the green padlock
icon. They rather believe that the green padlock icon can prevent phishing attacks.
Adversaries take advantage of users’ misunderstanding of the green padlock icon
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and launch their phishing websites with valid TLS certificates (Section 4.1). Users
may be tricked by the phishing websites with valid TLS certificates due to their
misunderstanding of the icons. We conduct a measurement study of the current
landscape of TLS (HTTPS) phishing websites with 5.5 phishing URLs. We observe
that the 1) CAs rarely revoke TLS certificates used for phishing websites and 2) a
CA’s vetting process fails (Section 4.1).
In the Code-Signing PKI, we first characterize the weaknesses in three main ac-
tors (CAs, publishers, and clients) that adversaries can exploit (Section 5.3). Then,
we systemically measure the security threat of the Code-Signing PKI in the wild to
understand the prevalence of malware signed with abusive code-signing certificates
(Section 5.3). We also attempt to understand the underground economy of code-
signing certificates (Section 5.4). Last, we measure the effectiveness of the primary
defense, revocation, against the abuses (Section 5.5). We observe that the current
revocation mechanism is incorrectly performed by CAs because of their misunder-
standing of the Code-Signing PKI and the inherent challenge of setting effective
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